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Creating a Nuclear Free Zone Treaty That
Is True to Its Name: The Nuclear Free
Zone Concept and a Model Treaty*
ARTHUR M. RIEMAN**
August 6, 1985 was the fortieth anniversary of the bombing of Hiro-
shima. That date also hailed another milestone in nuclear history. It was
then that the thirteen states of the South Pacific Forum' became the first
nation-group to declare their region a "nuclear free zone"2 as they con-
cluded the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty' (Treaty of Raro-
tonga). In so doing, these island states purported to create a "comprehen-
sive prohibition on all nuclear explosive devices" in their region of the
world.4 Eighteen years earlier, the entire block of Latin America nations
made history by creating a more limited "nuclear weapon free zone" of
their continent with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons
in Latin America5 (Treaty of Tlatelolco), prohibiting nuclear weapons
* (c) Copyright by Arthur M. Reiman, 1989.
** Associate, Christensen, White, Miller, Fink & Jacobs, Los Angeles. B.A., UCLA,
1977; M.B.A., Graduate School of Management, UCLA, 1979; J.D., UCLA School of Law,
1988.
I would like to express my deep gratitude to the dozens of foreign service officers of
several nations, as well as the other defense and nuclear affairs experts, who afforded me the
opportunity to question them about an ofttimes very sensitive subject. Most of the ambassa-
dors and other officers of embassies and United Nations missions spoke candidly about their
countries' interests in return for a promise of confidentiality. Particular thanks must go to
Washington attorney Eldon Greenberg and to Dr. Jiri Pulz, formerly of the United Nations
Security Council. I would also like to acknowledge Greenpeace U.S.A. and its Pacific Cam-
paign Director, Sebia Hawkins, for their support.
I dedicate this article to my parents, Arnold and Sylvia Rieman, who gave life to five
children with the hope that they would live in a world of peace. May their hopes, and those
of all parents, be realized.
1. The South Pacific Forum consists of the nations of Australia, Cook Islands, Fiji,
Kiribati, Nauru, New Zealand, Niue, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu,
Vanuatu and Western Samoa.
2. Fyfe & Beeby, The South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, 17 VIcT. U. WELLING-
TON L. REV. 33, 40 (1987).
3. South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, August 6, 1985, 24 I.L.M. 1440 [hereinafter
"Treaty of Rarotonga"]. The treaty is also known by its initials, SPNFZ.
4. Fyfe & Beeby, supra note 2, at 40. See infra § II.B.
5. Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, Feb. 14, 1967, 634
U.N.T.S. 281 [hereinafter "Treaty of Tlatelolco"].
The treaty contains a provision whereby it comes into force for a signatory upon its
ratification if it waives unanimous ratification otherwise called for. Treaty of Tlatelolco, art.
28(2), at 354. All but two ratifiers (Chile and Brazil) have adopted the waiver, see infra note
279 and accompanying text. So although Cuba and Guyana have yet to ratify the treaty, see
infra note 283 and accompanying text, it has entered into force for the remaining countries
of Latin America. See generally infra notes 279-83 and accompanying text.
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though not so-called peaceful nuclear explosions.
I. INTRODUCTION
The intent of this article is to analyze the concept of the nuclear free
zone as a vehicle for enhancing the protection from the dangers of nuclear
weapons, and radioactive contamination and pollution. Though no part of
the world can be totally free from a plague released by a nuclear war,
those statesmen who have crafted extant nuclear-free and nuclear-
weapon-free zone treaties believe that their efforts provide a bit more dis-
tance between the threat and the reality of nuclear war, as well as add a
shield for their countries from localized nuclear mishaps. The bench mark
for this analysis is the South Pacific Forum's South Pacific Nuclear Free
Zone Treaty, or Treaty of Rarotonga, due to its status as the most current
example of a nuclear free zone, as well as the new ground it has forged
compared to the Treaty of Tlatelolco and other proposed examples. Sec-
tion II introduces the concept of the nuclear free zone through a brief
discussion of the Treaty of Rarotonga as well as a history of the develop-
ment of nuclear free zones, from the earliest proposals made at the
United Nations to the present. The focus in Section III is an examination
of the strengths and shortcomings of the Rarotonga model and an explo-
ration of the additional protections future nuclear free zone drafters will
have to deal with in order to negotiate a more effective and truly nuclear
free treaty. Particular attention is given to the Law of the Sea as it may
bear on such a regime.
The Appendix consists of this author's Model Nuclear Free Zone
Treaty ("Model Treaty"). This document incorporates into a viable
framework the issues generated by the shortcomings of extant treaties.
The Model Treaty, admittedly, is idealistic. Some may view it as extrem-
ist. These views should not detract from the purpose of the Model
Treaty: it has been created to contribute to the international dialogue,
and possibly serve as a foundation for the negotiators of future nuclear
free zone treaties.6
Section IV of the article escorts the reader through each article of the
Model Treaty, directing attention to its key features and requirements.
The article concludes with a comparison of the substantive articles of the
Model Treaty with those of the Treaty of Rarotonga and, to a lesser ex-
tent, the Treaty of Tlatelolco.
6. See Fry, The South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone, BULL. OF CONCERNED ASIAN SCHOL-
ARs 61 (Apr.- June 1986).
ASEAN member states (Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and
Thailand) have been among the leaders in the effort to force the large naval powers to ac-
cept accommodation of the environmental and sovereign concerns of the smaller coastal
states in the negotiations of the Third United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.
See infra notes 20, 156-61, 168, 179, 187, 189 and accompanying text.
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II. THE CONCEPT OF THE NUCLEAR FREE ZONE
A. Early Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Proposals
The concept of a nuclear free or nuclear weapon free zone has been
with us for over thirty years. The first proposal for a nuclear weapon free
zone, known as the "Rapacki Plan," came in 1957 in the form of a Polish
statement to the United Nations General Assembly calling for the crea-
tion of a nuclear weapon free zone in Central Europe.7 Since then dozens
of similar resolutions covering Africa,8 South Asia,9 various regions of Eu-
rope,10 the Indian Ocean,' the Middle East 2 and Latin America,' have
been proposed and adopted by the General Assembly.
The primary objectives of the various nuclear weapon free zone pro-
posals, of which the Treaty of Tlatelolco is an example, have been the
"desire to secure the complete absence of nuclear weapons from various
areas of the globe [and] ... to spare nations concerned from the threat of
nuclear attack or involvement in nuclear war."' 4 These objectives theoret-
ically are attainable through several alternative routes. A prohibition on
7. Comprehensive Study of the Question of a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in All Its
Aspects 19, U.N. Doc. A/10027/Add. 1, U.N. Sales No. E.76.I.7 (1976) [hereinafter "Compre-
hensive Study"]. An even earlier proposal by the Soviet Union (in 1956) called for a ban on
"the stationing of atomic military formations and the location of atomic and hydrogen
weapons of any kind in" Central Europe. Official Records of the Disarmament Commission,
Supplement for January to December 1956, U.N. Doc. DC/83 Annex 5 (DC/SC.1/41)
(1957). In 1959, Ireland first proposed an area-by-area approach to nuclear non-prolifera-
tion. Comprehensive Study, at 19.
An attempt at a similar study was abandoned in the early 1980's, reportedly due to the
failure of consulting countries to agree on the language of a final report.
8. Comprehensive Study, supra note 7, at 23-25; A Synthesis of the Arguments Ad-
duced For and Against Each of the Four Proposals For the Creation of Nuclear-Weapon-
Free Zones That Have Been Included in the Agenda of the General Assembly (Africa,
South Asia, the Middle East and the South Pacific) and For and Against the Proposal For
the Establishment of a Zone of Peace in the Indian Ocean, Including a Subject and Coun-
try Index 3, U.N. Doc. A/AC.206/7 (1981) [hereinafter "Synthesis"]. The first proposals for
an African nuclear weapon free zone were in response to French nuclear testing in the Sa-
hara in the 1960's. Id. at 23.
9. See Comprehensive Study, supra note 7, at 27-28; Synthesis, supra note 8, at 11; A
Comprehensive Study of the Origin, Development and Present Status of the Various Al-
ternatives Proposed for the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons 19, U.N. Doc A/
AC.2061/5 (1981) [hereinafter "Comprehensive Study 2"]; supra note 32.
The People's Republic of China, though not a member of the United Nations at the
time, made the first calls for nuclear weapon free zones in both Asia and the South Pacific
in the late 1950's and early 1960's. Peking Review, Aug. 2, 1963.
10. See Comprehensive Study, supra note 7, at 20-23; Comprehensive Study 2, supra
note 9, at 17; infra note 32, infra note 104.
11. See Comprehensive Study, supra note 7, at 27-28; Synthesis, supra note 8, at 15;
infra note 32. The proposals for the Indian Ocean area have often been presented as plans
for an Indian Ocean "Zone of Peace." See, e.g., Synthesis, supra note 8, at 15.
12. Comprehensive Study, supra note 7, at 26-27; Synthesis, supra note 8, at 7; Com-
prehensive Study 2, supra note 9, at 18; infra note 32.
13. Comprehensive Study 2, supra note 9, at 16; infra notes 33-37.
14. Comprehensive Study, supra note 7, at 29.
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the possession or control of nuclear weapons by parties to a nuclear
weapon free zone treaty relies on the mutual assurance that no treaty
Party could launch a nuclear attack against another." Protocols signed by
the nuclear powers1 6 located outside of the zone of application" of a pro-
posed treaty provide that they will not use nuclear weapons against any
party to the treaty, nor deploy nuclear weapons on territory within the
zone which may be under their de jure or de facto jurisdiction. 8 How-
ever, each nuclear state has placed conditions on these declarations."
15. In banning the possession of nuclear weapons among all their number, the leaders
of the various Latin American states, among other reasons, sought to prevent any one Latin
American state from using nuclear weapons as a means to enforce their will among the
others. Robinson, The Treaty of Tlatelolco and the United States: A Latin American Nu-
clear Free Zone, 64 AM. J. INT'L L. 282, 282-84 (1970).
16. For purposes herein, "nuclear power" means any nation which has nuclear weapons.
Generally, this term refers to those states which acknowledge their nuclear capability, i.e.,
China, France, Great Britain, the Soviet Union and the United States. Other nations, com-
monly known as near-nuclear states, are believed to have nuclear weapons or the capability
to produce them, but will not publicly acknowledge this even though some have exploded
such weapons. Their inclusion in the discussion of nuclear powers is little more than aca-
demic. The near-nuclear states include Argentina, Brazil, India, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Libya,
Pakistan and South Africa. L. SPECTOR, GOING NUCLEAR (1987). Most, if not all, of the near-
nuclear states are not parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, infra note 47. Schwartz, Con-
trolling Nuclear Proliferation: Legal Strategies of the United States, 20 LAW & POL'Y IN
INT'L Bus. 1, 15 (1988).
The term "nuclear state" used herein should be distinguished from the term "nuclear-
weapon state" as used in the Non-Proliferation Treaty, infra note 47, where it means those
states having tested nuclear explosive devices prior to January 1, 1967. Id. art. IX, para. 3.
17. "Zone of application" means the geographic area comprised by the treaty in
question.
18. The parties to both the Treaty of Rarotonga and the Treaty of Tlatelolco recog-
nized that their efforts would have limited effect without the cooperation of the nuclear
powers. This limitation was solved by the use of protocols to be signed by the nuclear pow-
ers whereby they would agree not to violate terms of the treaty (a so-called "negative decla-
ration"), whether by: transporting or stationing (on territories controlled by the nuclear
power within the zone of application of the treaty) nuclear weapons in the applicable zone
of application, Treaty of Rarotonga, supra note 3, protocol 1, at 1459-60, Treaty of
Tlatelolco, supra note 5, protocols I, II, at 360, 366; threatening use of nuclear weapons
against party states, Treaty of Rarotonga, supra note 3, protocol 2, at 1461-62, Treaty of
Tlatelolco, supra note 5, protocol II, art. 3, at 364; contributing to a party state's violation of
the treaty, Treaty of Tlatelolco, supra note 5, protocol II, art. 2, at 364; or testing nuclear
weapons within the zone of application, Treaty of Rarotonga, supra note 3, protocol 3, at
1463.
The United Nations General Assembly has also passed a number of resolutions calling
for such negative assurances, including a call for an international convention providing such
a guarantee. Disarmament Resolutions Adopted by the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/
AC.2061/3, at 41-48. See also infra note 19.
19. For example, most nuclear powers acceded to the Tlatelolco protocols on the basis
that their obligations would in no way hinder self-defense. See J. GOLDBLAT, AGREEMENTS
FOR ARMS CONTROL 336-339 (1982). In the Rarotonga context, the U.S. and Soviet Union
hold differing views regarding port visitation rights. Whereas the United States has decried
New Zealand's ban on port visitations by nuclear warships and aircraft, see Glover, Is a
Nuclear-Free ANZUS Possible?, 2 CANTA. L. REV. 324 (1986), see also infra note 99 and
accompanying text, the U.S.S.R. has interpreted the Treaty of Rarotonga to hold that:
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Assuming that such "negative assurances" are ironclad, non-nuclear
states are not fully protected from nuclear attack. A nuclear power's mili-
tary base on third party soil which either services nuclear capable ships or
aircraft, or which stores, stations or deploys nuclear weapons, makes that
base vulnerable to nuclear attack should a conflagration arise between an-
other nuclear power and the one which maintains the base. The third
party state itself may not be the actual target of the attack but the dis-
tinction is moot once a nuclear strike is made against a base located
within its territory.2" This irony lies at the heart of the present nuclear
debate in Europe, and is articulated in the anti-nuclear thoughts of peo-
ple in Australia,"' New Zealand,2 2 Melanesia and Micronesia,2 3 the Philip-
pines,24 Latin America, 25 the Soviet Union2" and elsewhere in the Pacific.
[T]he admission of transit of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive de-
vices by any means, as well as of visits by foreign military ships and aircraft
within the nuclear free zone would ... contradict the aims of the treaty and be
inconsistent with the nuclear free states of the zone.
Statement of the Soviet Government on the occasion of signing Protocols 2 and 3 to the
South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone, Dec. 18, 1986.
The official United States position on negative assurances was articulated in 1978 by
President Carter:
The United States will not use nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear weapons
state party to the NPT or any comparable internationally binding commitment
not to acquire nuclear explosive devices, except in the case of an attack on the
United States, its territories or armed forces, or its allies, by such a state allied
to a nuclear weapons state, or associated with a nuclear weapons state in carry-
ing out or sustaining the attack.
United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Arms Control and Disarmament
Agreements 87 (1982).
20. The specter of such an event has not gone without concern. During the course of
negotiations of the Third United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, "Indonesia and
Malaysia were particularly worried about the risk of U.S. and Soviet submarines clashing in
their waters." C. SANGER, ORDERING THE OCEANS: THE MAKING OF THE LAW OF THE SEA 88
(1987).
For a Philippine professor's study detailing the effects of a nuclear attack on the Subic
and Clark bases leased to the United States, see Talisayon, Consequences of a Nuclear
Attack on the Military Bases, 1 FOREIGN REL. J. 90, (Manila) (1986).
See infra notes 220-26.
21. See infra notes 54-57 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 54-57, 99 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 67, 100 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 94-97 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 33-41 and accompanying text.
26. Growing concern among Soviet citizens about radiation leakage and other nuclear
dangers led to the recent banning of a nuclear-powered container ship from all major Soviet
Pacific ports early in 1989. Local mayors refused to grant permission for a ship, the
Sevmorput, to berth, and dockworkers said they would refuse to unload or handle the ship.
The Soviet newspaper Soviet Russia reported that "[a] huge wave of public indignation has
been set in motion by the lack of information, by [uncertainty about] the safety of the ship
itself, by an invisible shadow of the Chernobyl tragedy and by the complex ecological situa-
tion in the Soviet Far East." The official press agency, Novosti, described the dockworkers'
action as the "first ecologically inspired labor protest" in the Soviet Union. Parks, Four
Soviet Ports Bar Ship in Protest Over Nuclear Safety, L.A. Times, Mar. 7, 1989, § 1, at 1,
1990
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With modern technology, ships and aircraft presumed to be carrying
nuclear weapons are targets of attack by enemy states wherever they may
be located. Thus, if a warship capable of carrying nuclear weapons cruis-
ing in the territorial sea of a third party state were attacked, the result
would be the virtual equivalent of an attack on that state. This scenario
isn't addressed in any of the many nuclear weapon free zone proposals
proferred by the General Assembly.
The most likely reason for this omission is that the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea2 7 (UNCLOS III) and customary inter-
national law2 8 assure innocent passage through territorial seas. For a state
or treaty to prohibit transit of warships with nuclear capability through
territorial waters might appear to be in direct conflict with the Law of the
Sea which seeks to assure that, among other things, no foreign ship be
denied "innocent passage"29 though a coastal state's territorial sea. 0 In-
deed, a United Nations report expressed the view that parties to a nu-
clear free zone treaty "must respect international law, including those
principles relating to the high seas, to straits used for international navi-
gation and ... the right of innocent passage through the territorial sea."'"
col.1.
27. Third United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 21 I.L.M.
1245 [hereinafter "UNCLOS III"].
28. "Customary international law" refers to the regime of international order which
finds its source in custom and usage. It is generally considered binding on the entire inter-
national community. K. BOOTH, LAW, FORCE AND DIPLOMACY AT SEA (1985) [hereinafter
"LAW, FORCE AND DIPLOMACY"]. See infra notes 140-44 and accompanying text.
29. The "right of innocent passage," as enunciated in UNCLOS III, is granted to all
ships passing through the territorial sea. UNCLOS III, supra note 27, art. 17. The relevant
articles of UNCLOS III state as follows:
Article 18
Meaning of passage
1. Passage means navigation through the territorial sea for the purpose of:
(a)traversing that sea without entering internal waters or calling at a road-
stead or port facility outside internal waters; or
(b)proceeding to or from internal waters or a call at such roadstead or port
facility.
2. Passage shall be continuous and expeditious. However, passage includes
stopping and anchoring, but only in so far as the same are incidental to ordi-
nary navigation or are rendered necessary by force majeure or distress or for
the purpose of rendering assistance to persons, ships or aircraft in danger of
distress.
Article 19
Meaning of innocent passage
1. Passage is innocent so long as it is not prejudicial to the peace, good order
or security of the coastal State. Such passage shall take place in conformity
with this Convention and other rules of international law. ...
Id. (emphasis added). See id. arts. 19(2)-(3).
30. See infra § III.A.1.
31. Comprehensive Study, supra note 7, at 49. Interestingly, the same body of interna-
tional law also holds that "[plollution of the marine environment is contrary to ... freedom
of the seas." N. Rusina, International Legal Principles of Protection of the Marine Envi-
ronment Against Pollution, in THE LAW OF THE SEA AND INTERNATIONAL SHIPPING: ANGLO-
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Though there have been several proposals for nuclear weapon free
zones debated and approved by the General Assembly, 2 the first and
only such proposal to grow out of the United Nations which has seen
fruition is the Treaty of Tlatelolco.3 3 Since the signing of the Treaty of
Tlatelolco, not one of the many U.N. resolutions calling for a nuclear
weapon free zone has come to fruition. 4
The Treaty of Tlatelolco arose out of a 1963 Joint Declaration of five
Latin American presidents calling for the denuclearization of Latin
America.35 Denuclearization was seen as a means to keep that region free
from the economic and political pressure which would bear if their states
became entangled in the cold war or the development of nuclear weapons,
including the possibility that such weapons could be used against each
other.3 Mexico initiated a treaty preparatory commission the next year.
Three years of discussions culminated in the treaty. It addressed most of
the concerns raised in the General Assembly and, until the Treaty of Ra-
rotonga, was considered the prototypical nuclear free zone treaty. It also
served as a symbolic statement to the effect that a large region of the
world can make a distinguished and valuable contribution to universal
nuclear disarmament by declaring itself to be a nuclear weapon free
SOVIET POST-UNCLOS PERSPECTIVES 261, 262 (W.E. Butler ed. 1985). Rusina goes on to
argue that the anti-pollution regime found in the law of the sea is actually founded on basic
human rights. Quoting Professor M. Lazarev, she allows that "the protecting of nature,
flora, fauna, and man by international law is nothing other than the realisation [sic] of im-
portant human rights to life, health, normal conditions of existence, labor and leisure." Id.
at 268-269.
32. For example, in 1985 there were votes at the United Nations General Assembly for
denuclearization or nuclear weapon free zones in Africa, 40 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 53) (A/
90/92), the Middle East, 40 U.N. GAOR at 82, South Asia (G.A. Res. 40/83), and a Zone of
Peace in the Indian Ocean (G.A. Res. 40/153). In 1986, the General Assembly adopted reso-
lutions calling for nuclear weapon free zones in the Middle East (G.A. Res. 41/48), and
South Asia (G.A. Res. 41/49), and Zones of Peace in the Indian Ocean (G.A. Res. 41/87), and
the South Atlantic Ocean (G.A. Res. 41/11). Such resolutions are not new, however. Between
1961 and 1981 the General Assembly adopted 17 resolutions on an African nuclear free zone
and 14 on South Asia. Repeated proposals have also frequented the General Assembly for
the Middle East since 1974 and various parts of Europe (since 1957), including the Nordic
countries, the Balkans and Central Europe. See Delcoigne, An Overview of Nuclear-
Weapon-Free Zones, 24 IAEA BULL. 50 (1982); infra note 104; see, e.g., NUCLEAR DiSEN-
GAGEMENT IN EUROPE (S. Lodegaard & H. Thee eds. 1985); NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND NORTH-
ERN EUROPE (1983) (proposals for a Nordic Nuclear Weapon Free Zone).
33. The earliest call for a nuclear weapon free zone in Latin America came from the
United Nations delegate from Brazil shortly before the Cuban missile crisis. 17 U.N. GAOR
at 19, para. 25, U.N. Doc. A/PV.1125, (1962). As Robinson points out, "[t]he danger of
bringing the nuclear arms race between the super Powers [sic] into Latin America was no
longer hypothetical." Robinson, supra note 15, at 283.
34. Though there have been U.N. resolutions calling for a South Pacific nuclear free
zone, the Treaty of Rarotonga was negotiated by the South Pacific Forum in a mere seven
months, completely apart from any United Nations entities.
35. 18 U.N. GAOR Annex (Agenda Item 74) U.N. Doc. A/5415/Rev.1 (1963). The five
nations issuing the joint resolution were Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador and Mexico.
36. Joint Declaration of 29 April 1963 on the Denuclearization of Latin America, G.A.
Res. 1911 (xviii), 18 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 15) at 14, U.N. Doc. A/5618 (1963).
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zone.
37
That treaty's stated objective is to prohibit "[tihe testing, use, manu-
facture, production[,] acquisition ... receipt, storage, installation, deploy-
ment and any form of possession of any nuclear weapons" by or on behalf
of any party to the treaty.3 s Protocols to the treaty seek the assurances of
the nuclear powers that they will comport with the treaty as it relates to
their activities in Latin America 9 as well as not assist any contracting
party in violating treaty provisions.40 The Treaty of Tlatelolco does not
ban the development, testing or explosion of nuclear devices for "peaceful
purposes."
4 1
In actuality, the Treaty of Tlatelolco was not the first international
agreement to set aside a multinational region as a haven from nuclear
weapons. Rather, it was the first such agreement to cover a populated
region and the first to be imposed upon the territory of the treaty parties.
The first treaty prohibiting nuclear emplacement was the Antarctic
Treaty of 1959." Among its provisions, the treaty prohibits the stationing
of nuclear weapons, nuclear explosions and radioactive waste dumping
south of Latitude 600 South and on the Antarctic continent.4 3 The
Antarctic Treaty arose out of the 1957/1958 International Geophysical
Year, which had as one of its objectives the establishment of international
cooperation for the scientific research and preservation of Antarctica.4"
Two other treaties call for nuclear weapon prohibitions in outer and
inner space. Signed in the same year as the Treaty of Tlatelolco, the
Outer Space Treaty45 prohibits the stationing or deployment of nuclear
weapons or other weapons of mass destruction in space or on celestial
bodies. The 1971 Seabed Treaty bans the emplacement of nuclear weap-
ons on the seabed outside a coastal state's territorial sea.46 Furthermore,
37. Speech by Ambassador Alfonso Garcia Robles Delivered at the 133rd Meeting of
the First Committee of the General Assembly of the United Nations (Nov. 11, 1963), re-
printed in A. GARCIA ROBLES, THE DENUCLEARIZATION OF LATIN AMERICA 3-7 (1967).
38. Treaty of Tlatelolco, supra note 5, art. 1(1), at 330. The treaty also "undertake[s] to
refrain [any contracting party] from engaging in, encouraging or authorizing... [or] partici-
pating in the testing, use, manufacture, production, possession or control of any nuclear
weapon." Id. art. 1(2), at 330.
39. Id. protocol I, at 360, 362.
40. Id. protocol II, art. 2, at 364. A third provision of the protocols calls on the nuclear
powers to agree to not use nuclear weapons against contracting parties to the treaty. Id.
protocol II, art. 1, at 364.
41. Id. arts. 17, 18, at 346, 348.
42. Antarctic Treaty, Dec. 1, 1959, 12 U.S.T. 794, T.I.A.S. No. 4780, 402 U.N.T.S. 71.
43. Id. art. IV.
44. J. GOLDBLAT, supra note 19, at 60-63.
45. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use
of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T.
2410, T.I.A.S. No. 6347, 610 U.N.T.S. 205.
46. Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other
Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof,
Feb. 11, 1971, 23 U.S.T. 701, T.I.A.S. No. 7337, 955 U.N.T.S. 115.
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the Non-Proliferation Treaty 7 ("NPT") explicitly supports the formation
of nuclear free zones: "Nothing in this Treaty affects the right of any
group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total
absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories."'
B. The Treaty of Rarotonga
Eighteen years after Tlatelolco, the members of the South Pacific Fo-
rum surpassed the Treaty of Tlatelolco and extant United Nations pro-
posals by creating the world's first nuclear free zone, as opposed to sim-
ply a nuclear weapon free zone.'" The Treaty of Rarotonga sets forth a
comprehensive ban on the manufacture, acquisition, possession, deploy-
ment, stationing, emplacement or testing of nuclear explosive devices."' It
is also distinguishable in its prohibition on all nuclear explosive devices as
well as the dumping of radioactive wastes, 51 and its support for the pro-
tection of the environment of the South Pacific.52
It is significant that the Rarotonga Treaty was not negotiated inside
a United Nations-sponsored forum, nor was its development connected
with any U.N. resolution." The initial impetus for the South Pacific
47. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, July 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T. 483,
T.I.A.S. No. 6839, 729 U.N.T.S. 161.
48. Id. art. VII.
49. Indeed, because of its broader prohibitions, the states of the South Pacific Forum
purposefully describe the region created by the treaty as a nuclear free zone as opposed to a
nuclear weapon free zone. Fyfe & Beeby, supra note 2, at 40. From a slightly broadened
perspective, New Zealand Deputy Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Christopher Beeby, ex-
pressed that:
[Ilf you add the two together, the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty
which deals principally with nuclear weapons - but makes some reference to
dumping - and the Convention for the Protection of the Natural Resources
and Environment of the South Pacific Region [see infra note 52 and accompa-
nying text], I think you can characterize the package as a nuclear free South
Pacific.
Interview with Christopher Beeby in Radio New Zealand "Morning Report" (Nov. 28, 1986).
Some critics have been quick to point out that the Treaty of Rarotonga, despite its
official title, does not create either a true nuclear weapon free or nuclear free zone. See Fry,
supra note 6, at 61, 67-68.
It is of interest to note that there is now a call for a "nuclear free" zone in Central
America. The proposal, recently announced by the University of Costa Rica, would, among
other things, prohibit the transport of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruc-
tion within 300 miles of the Central American coast. Central American Nuclear-Free Zone
Proposed, Xinua General Overseas News Service, Feb. 13, 1990.
50. Treaty of Rarotonga, supra note 3, arts. 3-6, at 1444-46.
51. Id. art. 7 at 1447.
52. At the time the Treaty of Rarotonga was concluded, the nations of the South Pa-
cific were negotiating the now-concluded Convention for the Protection of the Natural Re-
sources and Environment of the South Pacific Region, [hereinafter SPREP]. The Treaty of
Rarotonga calls for "conclusion as soon as possible of the proposed Convention .... " id. art.
7(1)(d) at 1447, and holds for the supersession of the Convention over subsections of the
Treaty dealing with radioactive dumping. Id. art. 7(2).
53. However, the United Nations recently adopted a resolution endorsing the Treaty of
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treaty is found in the local reactions to American, British and, later,
French nuclear weapons testing in the South Pacific."' The destruction
inflicted upon many of the islands and peoples in that region and the
continuing threat of nuclear poisoning due to the on-going French nuclear
weapon testing program was part of the motivation to create the Treaty
of Rarotonga,5 and has since become a major rallying cry throughout the
region.5 6 Indeed, the first indigenous call for a nuclear free zone in the
South Pacific sounded shortly after New Zealand and Australia sought
condemnation before the International Court of Justice of France's nu-
clear weapons testing policy. 7
The South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty is a major step in the
non-nuclear states' struggle against the dangers of nuclear weapons and
radioactivity. Of course, it breaks new ground in the arena of multilateral
nuclear prohibitions. But, at a most powerful symbolic level, the Treaty
of Rarotonga, along with the contiguous Treaty of Tlatelolco and the
Antarctic Treaty, carves out a nuclear weapon free zone of more than
one-third of the Earth's surface."'
Though it stands as a significant advancement over its predecessors,
the Treaty of Rarotonga does not absolutely prohibit the presence of nu-
clear weapons nor radioactive substances other than those used for medi-
cal and non-military scientific purposes from within the zone of applica-
tion of the treaty. Despite its comprehensive array of prohibitions, it does
not prohibit the transit of nuclear devices through territorial seas, al-
though it does allow any country to establish its own policy on whether to
permit port visits by nuclear powered or nuclear capable warships or air-
craft.5 9 There are no provisions regarding nuclear transit through interna-
tional straits, 0 exclusive economic zones" or other ocean areas encom-
Rarotonga. Australia Welcomes U.N. Resolution on Rarotonga Treaty, Xinhua General
Overseas News Service, Dec. 19, 1989.
54. See Lippman, The SPNFZ Treaty: Regional Autonomy Versus International Law
and Politics, 10 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 110-115 (1987); R. Dalrymple (former Austra-
lian Ambassador to the United States), Australia and the South Pacific - The Treaty of
Rarotonga, speech to The World Affairs Council (Nov. 12, 1986) [hereinafter "Dalrymple
Speech"]; Fry, supra note 6; see also infra note 57 and accompanying text.
55. See infra notes 82-83 and accompanying text.
56. Id.
57. Nuclear Test Cases (Austl. v. Fr.; N.Z. v. Fr.), 1973 I.C.J. 99 (Interim Protection
Order); 1973 I.C.J. 135 (Interim Protection Order); 1974 I.C.J. Judgement 253; 1974 I.C.J.
Judgement 457.
58. The contiguous zone runs from Longitude 1150 East to Longitude 200 West, and
from the South Pole to the Equator and even as far north as Latitude 350 North in North
America.
59. Treaty of Rarotonga, supra note 3, art. 5(2), at 1446.
60. "Strait transit" or "transit passage" is the UNCLOS III regime which supplies rules
for transit through "straits which are used for international navigation between one part of
the high seas or an exclusive economic zone and another part of the high seas or an exclu-
sive economic zone." UNCLOS III, supra note 27, art. 37. See infra § III.A.l(b). The right
of transit passage is enjoyed by every ship or aircraft transitting a strait so long as it shall:
(a)proceed without delay through or over the strait;
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passed within the treaty's zone of application. It does not prevent a treaty
Party from contributing to a nuclear power's nuclear capability through
such indirect means as taking part in nuclear research or participating in
the control, operation or management of so-called "1CSI'62 installations
which are designed, in part, to assist in the fighting of a nuclear war.3
Although there is a ban on the dumping of radioactive wastes within the
Treaty of Rarotonga, 4 there is no prohibition on nuclear activities which
could produce such wastes, or any other non-essential uses of radioactive
substances.
Such abolitions may be practically, politically or economically diffi-
cult. Indeed, these factors limited the treaty from being a more stridently
nuclear-prohibitory document.6 5 Still, some champions of an absolute ab-
olition remain vocal.
In the wake of the Treaty of Rarotonga, local groups within (and
without) the South Pacific Forum criticized the treaty as being insuffi-
ciently restrictive." Though supportive of the concept during the Raro-
tonga Treaty negotiations, Vanuatu, a South Pacific nation, refused to
sign the treaty because it does not ban port visits by nuclear ships.67 Cit-
ing a history of anti-nuclear sentiment in the South Pacific, the Fiji Anti-
Nuclear Group ("FANG") proposed a draft Treaty for a Comprehensive
Nuclear Free Zone in the South Pacific with an aim toward eliminating
the "deficiencies" of the Rarotonga Treaty and creating a complete and
comprehensive, as opposed to "partial," nuclear free zone."
(b)refrain from any threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territo-
rial integrity or political independence of States bordering the strait, or in any
other manner in violation of the principles of international law embodied in
the Charter of the United Nations;
(c)refrain from any activities other than those incident to their normal
modes of continuous and expeditious transit unless rendered necessary by
force majeure or by distress....
Id. art. 39(1).
61. See infra § III.A.l.(c).
62. I.e., "Command, Control, Communication and Intelligence." See generally infra §
III.B.
63. See infra § III.B.
64. Treaty of Rarotonga, supra note 3, art. 7, at 1447.
65. See Report by the Chair of the Working Group on a South Pacific Nuclear Free
Zone (SPNFZ) 7-8 (1985) [hereinafter "Working Group Report"]; see supra note 9 and
accompanying text. Despite its decision not to sign the protocols to the Treaty of Rarotonga,
U.S. State Department spokesperson Charles Redman did acknowledge that "[tihe United
States is appreciative of the role of the Government of Australia and other parties to the
treaty in this matter, including their efforts to keep our and allied interests in mind as they
managed the composition of the treaty and protocols." St. Dep't Statement, Feb. 5, 1987.
66. See M. Hamel-Green, Draft Treaty for a Comprehensive Nuclear Free Zone in the
South Pacific (1986) (unpublished manuscript).
67. P. Powers, Nuclear Free Zones: The South Pacific Case, at 4, paper prepared for
the Round Table on the South Pacific Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone, Apr. 15-18, 1987.
68. M. Hamel-Green, supra note 66, at 1-2. The draft treaty proposed therein is herein-
after cited as "FANG Treaty."
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Criticism of the Treaty of Rarotonga has not only come from those
calling for stronger nuclear prohibitions. The United States, the United
Kingdom and France have refused to sign protocols to the treaty" which
would guarantee their acknowledgement of and respect for the zone. De-
spite an official U.S. policy supporting nuclear free zones which satisfy
specific criteria7" - criteria which the Rarotonga Treaty satisfies accord-
ing to State Department officials7" - the United States refuses to ratify
the protocols.7 ' The reason given by U.S. officials for this refusal is that
69. Both the Treaties of Rarotonga and Tlatelolco contain protocols whereby the nu-
clear powers and states having international responsibility for territories within the zone
would comply with the restrictions imposed by the respective treaty. All the nuclear powers
have signed the latter protocol to the Tlatelolco Treaty (Protocol II), though France has
refused to sign the protocol which would require it to apply the nuclear weapon restrictions
of the treaty for which France is "de jure or de facto ... internationally responsible." (Pro-
tocol I). Fyfe & Beeby, supra note 2, at 38.
France, the United Kingdom and the United States have refused to sign any of the two
similar protocols of the Rarotonga Treaty, as well as a third protocol calling for the prohibi-
tion of the testing of nuclear explosive devices within the region. See infra notes 9-11 and
accompanying text. These refusals came despite consultation with, and an attempt to reflect
the concerns of these nuclear powers, in the negotiation of the protocols. See infra note 9.
Nonetheless, Great Britain and the United States "have given assurances that they are not
currently acting in a manner inconsistent with the protocols," according to New Zealand
Disarmament and Arms Control Minister Fran Wilde. Solomon Islands Ratifies Nuclear
Free Zone Treaty, Xinhua General Overseas News Service, Feb. 28, 1989. See also, Austra-
lia Welcomes Solomons' Ratification of a Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, Xinhua General Over-
seas News Service, Mar. 6, 1989; House Urges Bush to Sign Pacific Nuclear Free Zone
Treaty, Reuter Library Report, Nov. 7, 1989 [hereinafter "House Urges Bush"]. France,
however, continues to test nuclear wepons in the South Pacific. See, e.g., France Resumes
Nuclear Tests in Pacific Despite Opposition, Reuter Library Report, May 12, 1989.
70. The United States has enunciated four criteria for accepting the validity of a nu-
clear weapon free zone: (1) the initiative must be taken by the states of the proposed zone
and the zone should preferably include all states within the area whose participation is
deemed important; (2) the creation of the zone should not disturb necessary security ar-
rangements; (3) the zone agreement must allow a nuclear nation the opportunity to move
through the zone with nuclear weapons (e.g., U.S. submarines carrying nuclear weapons
moving through Panama Canal to another area); and (4) provisions for adequate verification
are required.
71. Confidential interviews with officials of the United States Department of State and
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Anonymity was promised all United States and
foreign government and United Nations officials with whom the author spoke in preparing
this article.
72. The official U.S. position was read to the news media by U.S. State Department
spokesperson Charles Redman: "The United States ... has decided that in view of our
global security interests and responsibilities, we are not, under current circumstances, in a
position to sign the protocols [to the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty]." St. Dep't
Statement, Feb. 5, 1987.
South Pacific Forum states were particularly upset with the decision by the Reagan
Administration not to sign the Rarontonga protocols. The Forum
had sent a mission to the nuclear club capitals to discuss the protocols before
writing the final text. It had gone to great lengths to accommodate the views of
the U.S., so much so that it included a section which allows signatories to with-
draw from the protocols even though it raised criticism from those Forum
members who wanted a stronger treaty.
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the U.S. does not want to do anything to encourage other regions from
creating their own nuclear free or nuclear weapon free zones.7 s Moreover,
though President Reagan expressed his support for the non-proliferation
of nuclear weapons, 74 officials of his administration felt proliferation of
such regions would make it difficult for the U.S. to maintain its strategy
of nuclear deterrence, and a treaty which permits treaty Parties to pro-
hibit port visits would run contrary to U.S. strategic interests .7 Unoffi-
cially, the Reagan administration felt that there was little danger of nu-
clear proliferation in the South Pacific, so little was lost in the battle
against proliferation by not signing the protocols.70
The U.K. disfavors the Rarotonga Treaty for similar reasons.7 7 Addi-
'That decision was taken with some reservation but it was generally agreed
that if such a provision would facilitate endorsement of the protocols by the
major nuclear powers, it was worth doing,' [Fiji Prime Minister, Ratu Sir
Kamisese Mara] said. The South Pacific countries had on several occasions
supported the U.S. on matters that were important to it and had hoped there
would be 'some measure of reciprocity.'
We Won't Sign, Says America, ISLANDS Bus. 21 (Feb. 1987) [hereinafter "We Won't Sign").
In a press statement released the day of the U.S. announcement, New Zealand Prime
Minister David Lange echoed Mara's comments: "The United States response is... disap-
pointing in that intensive consultation took place with the United States authorities over
the Treaty and the protocols and considerable efforts were made to heed U.S. concerns."
Press Statement by the Prime Minister of New Zealand on Feb. 5, 1987.
The Reagan Administration's position was under fire within the Congress. As reported
by the Christian Science Monitor, the "House of Representatives recently passed a resolu-
tion in support of the treaty, and a chief treaty opponent, former United States Secretary of
Defense Caspar Weinberger, has retired." Pacific Anti-Nuclear Movement: Growing Force
for U.S. to Reckon With, Christian Sci. Monitor, Nov. 30, 1987, Int'l §, at 8, col. 1. Adhering
to his predecessor's position, President Bush has also refused to accede to the Treaty of
Rarontonga's protocols, despite a resolution passed by the House of Representatives calling
on the President to sign the treaty. House Urges Bush, supra note 69.
73. House Urges Bush, supra note 69.
74. During his first year in the White House, President Reagan stated that United
States policy was to "seek to prevent the spread of nuclear explosives to additional countries
as a fundamental national security and foreign policy objective .... " President's Statement
on Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy, 17 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 768, 769 (July 20, 1981).
75. House Urges Bush, supra note 69. The U.S. position was expressed by then-Secre-
tary of State Geroge Shultz: "I would hate to see the New Zealand policy in place, because it
would basically undermine the ability of the United States and its allies to defend the val-
ues that we and New Zealand and others share .... Joint News Conference, Manila, June
27, 1986, DEP'T ST. BuLL. 36, 37 (Sept. 1986). A contrary view has been expressed privately:
that the real reason is the "need[] to counter public pressure in foreign countries to ban
American vessels that carry nuclear weapons." Gordon, Denmark Agrees on Nuclear Policy,
N.Y. Times, June 8, 1988, § A, at 14, col. 1.
The Treaty of Rarontonga does not require its ratifiers to ban port visits. Rather, this is
an option reserved for each state to determine as it sees fit. Treaty of Rarontonga, supra
note 3, art. 5(2). This provision seems to reserve a right which would exist regardless of its
specification in the treaty.
76. Confidential interviews with officials of the United States Department of State, see
supra note 71.
77. Britain Rejects Pacific Nuclear-Free Treaty, Reuters (London), Mar. 20, 1987
[hereinafter "Reuters"].
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tionally, it believes that in this matter, support of its European Commu-
nity economic partner, France, is of superior interest to those of its Com-
monwealth partners and former colonies in the South Pacific."8 France,
too, elected to not sign the Rarotonga accord.7 9 France was also the lone
nuclear power which refused to ratify all of the Tlatelolco Treaty proto-
cols."0 Despite loud and persistent protests by South Pacific nations in-
cluding Australia and New Zealand,"' France persisted in testing nuclear
weapons in the atmosphere through 1974,82 and still tests its nuclear de-
vices underground in the South Pacific at Mururoa. a It is just such in-
transigence which helped give rise to the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone
Treaty.""
C. Unilateral Nuclear Prohibitions
Several nations 5 have taken unilateral steps toward protecting their
citizens from nuclear dangers. In 1979, the west Pacific island state of
Palau (Belau) adopted a constitution" which imposed a complete ban on
nuclear substances and weapons.8 ' That ban could only be overturned on
the three-fourths vote of the electorate.8 8 In 1986, Palau's President
78. Confidential interview with official of the British Foreign Ministry, see supra note
71. In the words of a Reuters story, "Western diplomats said the decision would be seen as
Britain falling in line with its fellow NATO nuclear powers rather than taking heed of the
wishes of traditional allies Australia and New Zealand." Reuters, supra note 75.
79. We Won't Sign, supra note 72.
80. France is the only eligible party not to ratify Additional Protocol I of the Treaty of
Tlatelolco. Fyfe & Beeby, supra note 2, at 38.
France long has maintained an independent nuclear policy in the era of nuclear history.
Among the Western nuclear powers it is the only one not a party to the Nuclear Non-
proliferation Treaty. Schwartz, supra note 16, at 16. (China, too, has not ratified the NPT,
id., though it has acceded to the Rarotonga protocols.)
81. See supra notes 54-57 and accompanying text.
82. Recent activities suggest France's willingness to resort to violations of international
law to prevent activities it feels may interfere with its testing program. The French sinking
of the Greenpeace ship Rainbow Warrior in Auckland harbor occurred just prior to its
scheduled departure to lead a flotilla to Mururoa to protest French nuclear testing.
83. Describing France's recalcitrance, one nuclear affairs scholar has written that
"[u]nlike the U.S. and Britain which have underground metropolitan sites in which to con-
duct nuclear explosions, France has been unwilling or unable to use its metropolitan terri-
tory to carry out its subsurface tests." The result of this policy is ironic: "The only military-
related nuclear activity in the huge area [the South Pacific] other than the passage of nu-
clear-armed craft, French testing has enabled regional states to try to lift themselves onto
the world nuclear disarmament stage by means of SPNFZ." P. Powers, supra note 67, at 4.
84. Lippman, supra note 54, at 113; K. Graham, Nuclear Weapon-Free Zones as an
Arms Control Measure 201 (1983) (dissertation, Vict. U. of Wellington) [hereinafter "Gra-
ham"]; P. Powers, supra note 67, at 4; R. PURVER, ARMS CONTROL: THE REGIONAL APPROACH
24 (1981).
85. See infra notes 86-112 and accompanying text.
86. CONST. OF THE REPUB. OF PALAU, adopted Apr. 2, 1979.
87. Id. art. XIII, § 6.
88. The Palau Constitution requires that
[h]armful substances such as nuclear, chemical, gas or biological weapons in-
tended for use in warfare, nuclear power plants, and waste materials therefrom
VOL. 18:2
CREATING A NUCLEAR FREE ZONE TREATY
signed a Compact of Free Association with the United States.8 9 It pro-
vided Palau with greater autonomy while the U.S. was to provide for its
defense. The Compact of Free Association, allowing the United States to
bring into Palau nuclear weapons, nuclear propelled ships and other nu-
clear substances, was approved without the Constitutionally required
three-fourths vote.90 Litigation ensued9 challenging the validity of the
Compact. The conflict eventually reached the Supreme Court of Palau,
which ruled that the Compact of Free Association was not lawfully ap-
proved and therefore was invalid.2 Subsequent attempts to sidestep the
Palau constitution have met strong opposition in the Palau legislature
and courts.' 3
shall not be used, tested, stored or disposed of within the territorial jurisdic-
tion of Palau without express approval of not less than three-fourths the votes
cast in a referendum of this specific question.
Id. art. XIII, § 6. Another provision stipulates that any "agreement which authorizes the
use, testing, storage or disposal of nuclear, toxic, chemical, gas or biological weapons in-
tended for use in warfare shall require the approval of not less than three-fourths the votes
cast in such referendum." Id. art. II, § 3.
89. Palau was formerly part of the U.S.-administered Trust Territory of the Pacific
Islands. For a discussion of the problems affecting the eventual completion of the Compacts
of Free Association of the United States with several of its former Micronesian Trust Terri-
tories, see Comment, Reconciling Independence and Security: The Long Term Status of
the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, 4 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 210 (1985).
Some argue that the U.S. wants Palau as a "back-up" in case Clark Air Force Base and
Subic Bay Naval Base in the Philippines are closed. Iveren, Vote to End Pacific Islands'
Atom-Arms Ban is Challenged, N.Y. Times, Oct. 13, 1987, §A, at 19, col. 1; Dibblin, Vote
Again Until You Get It Right, U.S. Tells Islanders, New Statesman, Mar. 14, 1986, at 86.
Cf. note 94 and accompanying text. See infra notes 94-96.
90. Gibbons v. Salii, No. 8-86, slip op. at 2 n.1 (Palau 1986). The United States' other
"vital" link to the Indian Ocean, its base on the island of Diego Garcia, is also under fire.
The government of Mauritius is challenging the U.S. base there, claiming the island as part
of its sovereign territory. Mauritius: Angry Over U.S. Stand on Diego Garcia, Inter Press
Service, Nov. 14, 1989.
91. Gibbons v. Salii, Civ. No. 101-86 (Tr. Div., July 10, 1986).
92. Gibbons v. Salii, No. 8-86, slip op. (Palau 1986).
93. In spite of, or perhaps because of, the Palau Supreme Court's decision in Gibbons v.
Salii, supra note 90, pro-Compact parties, including President Lazarus Salii, persisted, em-
ploying ever more pressure on the Constitutionalists. In June 1987, the fifth plebiscite to
approve the Compact was held. But the week before the vote, President Salii laid off two-
thirds of all government employees. Salii took the action "because [the] prospective Com-
pact of Free Association with the United States, which would have brought in [$1 billion of
U.S. aid over 40 years, $141 million in the first year] if approved, apparently was headed for
defeat." Palau Going Broke, Laying Off Workers, L.A. Times, July 3, 1987, § 1, at 11, col. 1.
The June 30 vote nonetheless was the same as the previous four, turning down the Compact.
L.A. Times, July 6, 1987, § 1, at 2, col. 2.
A new tactic was employed early in August of that year, when a vote was held to amend
the constitution to allow a modification of the its anti-nuclear provisions - and thus ap-
proval of the Compact - with a simple majority vote instead of three-quarters. It passed on
August 4. Less than three weeks later, a sixth vote was held on the Compact. It received the
same percentage of votes as in previous elections, but this time it was enough to pass. L.A.
Times, Aug. 7, 1987, § 1, at 2, col. 1; Palau Drops Nuclear Stand, N.Y. Times, Aug. 7, 1987,
§ A, at 24, col. 1. The August votes were immediately challenged in a lawsuit and in the
Palau legislature. However, a death threat against the Chief Justice of the Palau Supreme
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The new Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines also pro-
vides for the possible prohibition of nuclear weapons. One provision
reads: "[t]he Philippines, consistent with its national interest, adopts and
pursues a policy of freedom from nuclear weapons in its territory.""' Leg-
islation passed by the Philippine Senate "bars the development, manu-
facture, acquisition, testing, use, introduction, installation or storage" of
nuclear arms and components. It bans nuclear-powered ships and planes
unless their entry is authorized by a Philippine commission. 5 The bill
awaits action by the Philippine House of Representatives in its next
term. 96 Even prior to the drafting of the new constitution, the Aquino
government permanently closed a recently completed nuclear power
plant, prohibiting it from being fueled up, despite the billions of dollars
(U.S.) poured into its construction cost by the former government.9 7
Some South Pacific Forum states have also taken actions which pro-
vide greater restrictions on nuclear weapons than those afforded by the
Rarotonga Treaty. In addition to Vanuatu's strong stand,9 s New Zealand
has a port visit policy which bans any warship or military aircraft con-
taining nuclear weapons, as well as nuclear powered vessels, from visiting
its ports and airfields. All military craft must provide sufficient informa-
tion to allow the Prime Minister to determine that they are free from
such weapons before being allowed permission to enter New Zealand fa-
cilities.9 Fiji formerly had a similar policy, and a new government was
Court caused him to halt hearings on the lawsuit. Iveren, supra note 89. Nearly a year later
in May, 1988, the Palau Supreme Court ruled that the referendum suspending the constitu-
tion and the subsequent plebescite on the Compact were invalid, returning the situation to
square one. Osmond, Starting Over Again: Court Rules Referendums on Future Invalid,
FAR E. EcON. REV., May 18, 1988, at 38.
In August of 1988, President Lazarus Salii was found dead in his home. Osmond, Death
in the Afternoon: Salii May Be Gone, But Palau is the Likely Victim, FAR E. EcON. REV.,
Sept. 1, 1988, at 26.
In the most recent election, pro-Compact forces again failed to muster the necessary
votes to approve the Compact. In contrast to previous elections, which saw as much as 72%
support for the Compact, February's vote only achieved a 60.5% showing for the Compact.
Roundup: Palau - Independence Remains Uncertain, Xinhua General Overseas News Ser-
vice, Mar. 18, 1990.
94. CONST. OF THE REPUB. OF THE PHIL., art. II, § 8 (1986).
95. Philippine Senate OKs Bill Opposed by U.S. That Would Bar Nuclear Weapons,
L.A. Times, June 7, 1988, § 1, at 5, col. 1.
96. Id.
97. Senoren, Philippine Nuclear Plant to Make Way for Coal Power, Fin. Times, Sept.
25, 1986, at 4; see also Dumaine, The $2.2 Billion Nuclear Fiasco, FORTUNE, Sep. 1, 1986, at
38.
98. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
99. New Zealand's anti-nuclear legislation contains the following provisions:
When the Prime Minister is considering whether to grant approval to the
entry of foreign warships into the internal waters of New Zealand, the Prime
Minister shall have regard to all relevant information and advice that may be
available to the Prime Minister including information and advice concerning
the strategic and security interests of New Zealand.
The Prime Minister may only grant approval for the entry into the inter-
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voted into office in 1987 on a platform which included a pledge to rein-
state the port visit ban."'
nal waters of New Zealand by foreign warships if the Prime Minister is satis-
fied that the warships will not be carrying any nuclear explosive device upon
their entry into the internal waters of New Zealand.
When the Prime Minister is considering whether to grant approval to the
landing in New Zealand of foreign aircraft, the Prime Minister shall have re-
gard to all relevant information and advice that may be available to the Prime
Minister including information and advice concerning the strategic and secur-
ity interests of New Zealand.
The Prime Minister may only grant approval to the landing in New Zea-
land by any foreign military aircraft if the Prime Minister is satisfied that the
foreign military aircraft will not be carrying any nuclear explosive device when
it lands in New Zealand.
Entry into the internal waters of New Zealand by any ship whose propul-
sion is wholly or partly dependent on nuclear power is prohibited.
New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone, Disarmament, and Arms Control, Bill enacted June 4,
1987 by the New Zealand House of Representatives, Oct. 16, 1986, 11 9-11.
Prime Minister Lange's position is widely supported by the New Zealand people. De-
spite serious economic problems, Lange's party was overwhelmingly re-elected in August,
1987 elections. Even the conservative opposition has adopted an anti-nuclear platform. Bar-
ber, New Zealand Premier Vows Anti-Nuclear Activity in 2nd Term, Christian Sci. Moni-
tor, Aug. 17, 1987, Int'l §, at 11, col. 1; Lange Wins a 2nd Term in New Zealand, L.A.
Times, Aug. 16, 1987, § 1, at 6, col. 4; Evans, Labor is Winner in New Zealand Vote, N.Y.
Times, Aug. 16, 1987, § 1, at 3, col. 1. A 1988 poll revealed 84% of New Zealand's population
in support of Lange's anti-nuclear policy. New Leader Says Nuke Ban 'Will Not Change',
United Press Int'l, Aug. 8, 1989. David Lange's successor as Prime Minister, Geoffrey
Palmer, vowed to uphold Lange's nuclear policy immediately upon being sworn in. Id.
Australia, New Zealand and the United States were partners in the ANZUS alliance,
Security Treaty Between Australia, New Zealand and the United States, Sept. 1, 1951, 3
U.S.T. 3420, T.I.A.S. No. 2493, 131 U.N.T.S. 83 [hereinafter "ANZUS"], until the U.S. sus-
pended its defense obligations to New Zealand following that country's decision to ban port
visits by nuclear capable warships. DEP'T ST. BULL., Sept. 1986, at 86. See S. MCMILLAN,
NEITHER CONFIRM NOR DENY: THE NUCLEAR SHIPS DISPUTE BETWEEN NEW ZEALAND AND THE
UNITED STATES (1987). New Zealand claims that ANZUS is a conventional, not nuclear alli-
ance. Glover, supra note 19. Nonetheless, New Zealand has called the alliance "dead." New
Zealand Leader Says Security Alliance with U.S. Dead, Reuters, Apr. 24, 1989.
On one hand ANZUS has always been a loose confederation and was eventually con-
cluded primarily over concerns about future Japanese aggression. See generally Glover, id.;
3 Documents on New Zealand External Relations: The ANZUS Pact and the Treaty of
Peace With Japan (1985). On the other hand, the United States policy of defense for its
allies (and, thus, meeting its treaty obligations) through deterrence depends upon using
whatever capabilities it believes necessary. As former U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz
expressed: "I would hate to see the New Zealand policy in place, because it would basically
undermine the ability of the United States and its allies to defend the values that we and
New Zealand and others share .... " Joint News Conference, Manila, June 27, 1986, DEP'T
ST. BULL., Sept. 1986, at 36, 37. However, "American officials say privately that the rule [by
which the U.S. refuses to confirm a nuclear presence and thus the incompatibility with the
New Zealand policy] is needed to counter public pressure in foreign countries to ban Ameri-
can vessels that carry nuclear weapons." Gordon, supra note 75. See Note, The Incompati-
bility of ANZUS and Nuclear Weapon Free Zones, 45 VA. J. INT'L L. 455, 464-466 (1987).
100. On April 11, 1987 Fiji voters elected a coalition government on a platform which
promised the banning of port visits by nuclear warships. The leaders of a coup the following
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Concern over the dangers associated with nuclear weapons and radio-
activity is not limited to the Pacific. Sweden, one of the most heavily
nuclear dependent states in the world (forty-seven percent of the Scandi-
navian nation's power is nuclear' 1 ), voted in a 1980 referendum to phase
out all nuclear power plants in operation or under construction by 2010
and to prohibit the construction of any new nuclear power plants.0 2 In
the wake of the near-total meltdown of a nuclear power plant at
Chernobyl in the Soviet Union in 1986, the Swedes reaffirmed their 1980
vote and undertook to begin the phase-out process by 1995.103
Sweden's Nordic neighbors also have relatively tough anti-nuclear
positions.104 Though a member of NATO and strategically located along
the Soviet Union's northwest flank, Norway prohibits the emplacement of
nuclear weapons on its territory, except in case of an attack or threat of
attack. 0 5 In addition, Norway bans nuclear power plants.0 6 Norway is
now leading the movement for a Nordic Nuclear Weapon Free Zone.0
NATO member Iceland has an official policy 08 of not permitting nuclear
weapons anywhere within its territory except at time of war, including its
territorial sea. Denmark, also a NATO country, has a thirty year ban on
nuclear powered ships and those carrying nuclear weapons'019 which has
never been actively enforced. Last year Danish voters approved a referen-
dum calling for Denmark to enforce this policy,"0 sending shock waves
month and a subsequent coup later in the year vowed to not enforce a port visits ban. Coup
Plus Coup Makes Three, TIME, Oct. 12, 1987, at 46; No Medals: Fiji Gets a Government at
Last, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 3, 1987, at 19.
101. Winder, Letter from Sweden, Christian Sci. Monitor, Sept. 18, 1986, at 9.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. The Nordic countries have been leading proponents of the concept of a nuclear
weapon free zone and have a relatively long and constant history of debating such for their
region. The first inquiry was made by Sweden in 1961. Comprehensive Study, supra note 7,
at 20, 25; Nuclear Weapons and Northern Europe (1983). Two years later the President of
Finland proposed a Nordic nuclear-weapon-free zone. Id., at 25. Several additional propos-
als have been made by the various Scandinavian countries and the Soviet Union. Id. Most
recently, at the Nordic foreign ministers meeting in 1987, attending members decided to
"investigate the conditions for a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Nordic area as a part of
the endeavours to lessen tensions and reduce armaments in Europe." Statement from The
Nordic Foreign Ministers Meeting, Reykjavik, Mar. 25-26, 1987.
105. 20 CURRENT NOTES ON INT'L AFF. 441 (1949).
106. However, Norway does operate a small (20 megawatts) heavy water research reac-
tor used by the Western scientific community.
107. In 1984 the Norwegian Stortinget (Parliament) voted to pursue a nuclear weapon
free zone with its Nordic Pact allies. See KGL, Utenriksdepartement, Sprsmalet om en
Kjernevapenfri Sone i Norden 7-10 (1985).
108. A. Carsten Damsgaard, The Nordic Area As a Nuclear-Weapon Free Zone? 9-10
(unpublished manuscript) (1985). It expects the superpowers, however, to respect this policy
in good faith and does not ask foreign states if their vessels and aircraft deploy such weap-
ons. Id.
109. Slicing NATO Too Thin in Denmark, N.Y. Times, May 9, 1988, § A, at 18, col. 1.
110. Raines, Danish Voting Tuesday Centers on Military Issues, N.Y. Times, May 9,
1988, § A, at 9, col. 1.
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through the United States State Department."'
On a more localized level, communities and provinces throughout the
world have declared themselves nuclear free zones.12
III. REDEFINING THE BREADTH OF NUCLEAR FREE ZONES
Bold as it may be, the Treaty of Rarotonga represents only one step
toward complete "nuclear freedom" for treaty states and toward world-
wide nuclear disarmament. There is a great deal that a nation or group of
nations can do to achieve a truly "complete and comprehensive" nuclear
free zone.
Just as the South Pacific Forum states enhanced and expanded upon
the prohibitions contained in the Latin American treaty,"' forthcoming
treaties can and likely will further the nuclear proscriptions established
by the 1985 accord. Such an undertaking will require careful scrutiny of
the workability and effectiveness of the extant treaties from both theoret-
ical and pragmatic viewpoints. The drafters and negotiators of future nu-
clear free zone treaties will want to look at what they hope to achieve,
what the Tlatelolco and Rarotonga Treaties set out to achieve and what
in fact those treaties have achieved.
Though a milestone at the time, from the perspective of the modern
nuclear prohibitory movement, the intended scope of the Tlatelolco
Treaty is decidedly limited. Compare, for example, the primary objectives
of the Treaty of Tlatelolco with those of the Treaty of Rarotonga. The
former, entitled a "treaty for the prohibition of nuclear weapons," only
prohibits "[tihe testing, use, manufacture, production, acquisition ... re-
ceipt, storage, installation, deployment and ... possession of any nuclear
weapons . . . . " It expressly allows contracting states "to use . . . for
peaceful purposes the nuclear material and facilities which are under
111. U.S. Concerns Over Danish Parliamentary Resolution, DEP'T ST. BULL., June,
1988, at 31. American and NATO concern over the impact of the resolution was resolved by
a Danish government assumption that foreign military ships will be "in compliance with the
rules laid down by the Danish Government." Gordon, supra note 75, quoting Danish Prime
Minister Poul Schluter.
112. For example, as of December, 1988, there were 4,407 nuclear free zones in 23 coun-
tries. Nuclear Free Zones in the World, THE NEW ABOLITIONIST, Mar. 1990, at 9, col. 3. One
hundred and sixty-eight nuclear free zones with a total population of more than 16.8 million
citizens have been declared by voters in the United States. Nuclear Free Zones in the
United States, THE NEw ABOLITIONIST, Mar. 1990, at 12 , col. 1.
It has been argued that nuclear free zone ordinances in the United States may not be
legally binding if the federal government invokes the supremacy clause or other powers
granted by the U.S. Constitution. See Weaver, et al., The Legality of the Chicago Nuclear
Weapon Free Zone Ordinance, 17 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 553 (1986).
In a recent development, the Justice Department has brought suit to block a "second
generation" nuclear free zone ordinance adopted by Oakland, California. Stein, Effort to
Derail Nuclear-Free Zones Reported, L.A. Times, Mar. 22, 1990, § A, at 3, col. 1.
113. See infra notes 38-41, 50-52 and accompanying text.
114. Treaty of Tlatelolco, supra note 5, art. l(1)(a)-(b), at 330.
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their jurisdiction."11 The later Rarotonga Treaty renounces all nuclear
explosive devices, 16 much exploitation of fissionable material," the
dumping of radioactive wastes at sea,"18 as well as the manufacture, pos-
session, control over," 9 stationing1 2 0 and testing12 1 of all nuclear explosive
devices.
It is readily conceivable that any future nuclear free zone treaty will
consider the principal provisions of the Treaty of Rarotonga as its mini-
mum standard or starting point. The difficult issues for future negotiators
will be those which expand the scope of such treaties beyond that of the
South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, including:
1) A ban on the transit of nuclear weapon carrying vessels through
treaty Parties' territorial seas and exclusive economic zones;
2) Participation in intelligence systems designed to aid nuclear war
fighting capabilities;
3) Military alliances with nuclear powers;
4) Civilian nuclear programs, including nuclear power plants, non-
essential consumer and industrial uses of radioactive materials;
5) Radioactive waste disposal; and, last but not least,
6) How to effect compliance of the nuclear powers with a nuclear free
zone treaty.
The remainder of this Section will explore these topics.
A. Nuclear Transit
One striking limitation of virtually all nuclear free and nuclear
weapon free zone treaty proposals tendered by international bodies is
their failure to prohibit the transit of nuclear weapons through territorial
seas and exclusive economic zones ("EEZ") of treaty parties. As has al-
ready been demonstrated herein, 22 the presence of a warship or military
aircraft which is believed to be carrying nuclear weapons exposes any
land or sea territory within several or even dozens of kilometers of that
vessel or plane to the potential effects of nuclear attack or explosion. Ob-
viously, the most effective way to guarantee against this risk, absent a
worldwide ban on nuclear weapons, is to enforce a ban of such craft from
anywhere within the territorial sea, EEZ or the treaty's zone of
application.
115. Id. art. 1(1), at 330.
116. Treaty of Rarotonga, supra note 3, art. 3, at 1444-45.
117. Id. art. 4 at 1445.
118. Id. art. 7 at 1447.
119. Id. art. 3(a) at 1444-45.
120. Id. art. 5(1) at 1446.
121. Id. art. 6.
122. See supra notes 20-31 and accompanying text.
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1. The Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III): An Overview
A prohibition on nuclear transit " is all but guaranteed to spark con-
troversy. On the surface, such a ban would appear to violate the rule of
the law of the sea""' which provides for innocent passage of non-hostile
ships within a coastal state's territorial sea and disavows any attempt to
ban passage on the high seas.""
Similar objections would be raised if the ban also affected the newly
created right of "transit passage. '"26 Transit passage, or "strait transit" as
it is called by UNCLOS III, purports to guarantee the right of passage
through "straits which are used for international navigation between one
part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone and another part of
the high seas or an exclusive economic zone.11 7 This provision operates
much in the same way as those protecting the right of innocent passage,
but without many of the rights afforded the strait state by the innocent
passage regime,' s including the proscription on passage which is "preju-
dicial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal State .... . ",
Additional concerns would be raised over any plan to ban nuclear transit
through exclusive economic zones.
Historically,'30 the major naval powers 8' have asserted their "right"
to unrestrained transit upon the high seas.'32 Similarly, the naval powers
123. For purposes herein, "nuclear transit" means the transit or passage of any aircraft
or seagoing vessel which either carries nuclear weapons (including nuclear explosive devices
not classified as "weapons") or is capable of carrying nuclear weapons but which refuses to
confirm whether or not it is carrying such weapons.
124. UNCLOS III, supra note. 27, arts. 17-19, 21 I.L.M. 1245, at 1273-74. See infra §
III.A.2.(a).
125. "High seas" is defined as "all parts of the sea that are not included in the exclu-
sive economic zone, in the territorial sea or in the internal waters of a State, or in the
archipelagic waters of an archipelagic State." UNCLOS III, supra note 27, art. 86, 21 I.L.M.
1245, at 1286. "Territorial sea" refers to that portion of coastal waters lying within a coastal
state's sovereign jurisdiction. Id. art. 2, 21 I.L.M. 1245, at 1272. The currently accepted limit
of a state's territorial sea is twelve miles. Id. art. 3, 21 I.L.M. 1245, at 1272.
126. UNCLOS III, supra note 27, arts. 37-39, 21 I.L.M. 1245, at 1276-77. See infra §
III.A.2.(b) for a detailed discussion of transit passage as it relates to a ban on nuclear
transit.
127. Id. art. 37, 21 I.L.M. 1245, at 1276. Another UNCLOS III article states that,
"[s]tates bordering straits shall not hamper transit passage.... There shall be no suspen-
sion of transit passage." Id. art. 44, 21 I.L.M. 1245, at 1278.
See generally UNCLOS III, supra note 27, arts. 34-45, 21 I.L.M. 1245, at 1276-78.
128. See id. arts. 17-26, 21 I.L.M. 1245, at 1274.
129. See id. art. 19, 21 I.L.M. 1245, at 1274.
130. "Historically, naval mobility had been served by the doctrine of freedom of the
seas .... " LAW, FORCE AND DIPLOMACY, supra note 28, at 63.
131. In turn, the Greeks and the Romans controlled the sea lanes. Id. at 14. In the 17th
century, the British were the dominant naval power. Id. at 14. In the late 20th century, the
U.S. and U.S.S.R. are the major naval powers. See generally J. SaENIus, NEGOTIATING THE
LAW OF THE SEA 75 (1984).
132. In more recent times, an important "aspect of Britain's ability to use the sea was
the doctrine of belligerent's rights .... The doctrine of freedom of the sea was merely a
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have attempted to exercise ever greater sovereignty over the seas while
denying this same "creeping jurisdiction" to lesser powers. 3' The modern
invocation of the law of the sea, as reflected in the third United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea T13 reflects the will of the naval pow-
ers,' 3 5 and includes certain rights'3" of coastal states over their territorial
seas (not including the right to block innocent passage'3 7). Though the
Law of the Sea negotiation process has been resistant to attempts by the
non-nuclear coastal states to extend their jurisdiction over the seas,'3 " the
zone of sovereignty (total or otherwise) exercised by coastal states has
gradually expanded.'3 9
As early as 1702, the limit of the territorial sea was agreed to be
about three nautical miles - the maximum range of a cannon."" But
there has been "an almost irresistible tendency for national jurisdiction to
creep beyond the existing" limits."" In the years following World War II,
many states claimed a twelve mile territorial sea."" Today the territorial
sea is acknowledged by UNCLOS III to reach to twelve miles. '" Simi-
larly, some states claimed rights out to 200 miles. In addition, UNCLOS
III recognizes a zone of economic dominion (the so-called "exclusive eco-
nomic zone") of up to 200 miles.1 4 '
Although the cartographer's lines of claimed and universally recog-
nized rights of sovereignty over the seas have expanded, the inviolability
of these perimeters continues to evade universal acceptance. So too have
the rules regarding the rights of transitting ships - or coastal states -
been unevenly applied by all states. Many states, including the U.S. and
the U.S.S.R., proclaim rights beyond those generally accepted by UN-
symptom of the fact that nations attempt to further their interests by whatever instruments
they have at their disposal, be they military or economic, diplomatic or legal." LAW, FORCE
AND DIPLOMACY, supra note 28, at 13-14.
133. K. Booth, The Military Implications of the Changing Law of the Sea, in THE LAW
OF'THE SEA: NEGLECTED ISsUES 343-354 (1979) [hereinafter "K. Booth"].
134. See generally UNCLOS III, supra note 27.
135. See generally J. SEBENIUS, supra note 131.
136. UNCLOS III, supra note 27, arts. 19-22, 24-25, 21 I.L.M. 1245, at 1274-75.
137. Id. arts. 17-19, 21 I.L.M. 1245, at 1273-74.
138. J. SEBENIUS, supra note 131, at 71-109.
139. See infra notes 140-44 and accompanying text.
140. After a half century or so of early attempts to define the concept we now know as
"territorial sea," Cornelius van Bynkersheim "suggested that a state's dominion over the sea
should be restricted to the range over which its power extended from the adjacent land.
This was taken to be the maximum range of a canon . . .the distance agreed was three
miles." LAW, FORCE AND DIPLOMACY, supra note 28, at 15.
141. Id. at 38.
142. In 1945, the Truman Doctrine was announced whereby the United States claimed
certain rights over its entire continental shelf. Following that initiative, many countries uni-
laterally claimed a territorial sea of anywhere from 12 to 200 miles. Id. at 16. By 1972, of 111
coastal states, only 25 still accepted the traditional three mile limit. Id. at 36.
143. UNCLOS III, supra note 27, art. 3, 21 I.L.M. 1245, at 1272.
144. Id. art. 57, 21 I.L.M. 1245, at 1280.
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CLOS III.' 4 5 At least ten states1 46 invoke some regulation of foreign vessel
transit through their exclusive economic zones. More than two dozen
states require notification and/or approval before foreign warships may
pass into their territorial sea.147 Others claim special security zones.,4 4 Ca-
nada's claimed rights extend 600 miles north of its mainland coast, hav-
ing "closed" the entire Northwest Passage and the Arctic Archipelago.149
Among the nuclear powers, the Soviet Union claims full sovereignty over
the Sea of Okhotsh,'5 ° having declared it closed to foreign vessels, and the
United States has established over 100 danger zones, primarily used for
test firing, within and without its territorial sea, often completely banning
transit by all but U.S. naval ships.'5 1
Many of the exceptions to full compliance with these provisions of
the law of the sea are not based exclusively on military grounds. Preven-
tion of pollution has been the justification for restrictions on unhindered
transit. Canada has invoked some of the toughest regulation based on en-
vironmental concerns. "Under the Eastern Canadian Traffic Regulation
System (ECAREG) all ships over 500 g.r.t. entering the ECAREG traffic
zone are required to request clearance twenty-four hours in advance. The
145. See infra notes 146-51 and accompanying text. The United States first claimed
sovereignty beyond the three mile limit in 1945. The Truman Doctrine claimed a right over
the continental shelf. LAW, FORCE AND DIPLOMACY, supra note 28, at 16. The U.S.S.R. claims
complete sovereignty over the Sea of Okhotsh.
146. Guyana, India, Mauritius, Nigeria, Pakistan and the Seychelles regulate passage of
foreign vessels in their EEZs, and the Maldives, Mauritania, Portugal and the U.S.S.R. regu-
late navigation in special zones of their EEZs. Alexander, Geographical Perspectives on In-
ternational Navigation, Paper Presented at the East-West Center/ Law of the Sea Institute
Conference on International Navigation (Jan. 1986). Additionally, Brazil exercises control
over military maneuvers in its EEZ. CONSENSUS AND CONFRONTATION: THE UNITED STATES
AND THE LAW OF THE SEA CONVENTION 302-305 (J. Van Dyke ed. 1985).
147. TRANSIT OF NUCLEAR-WEAPON BEARING VESSELS AND AIRCRAFT: THE RAROTONGA
TREATY AND THE LAW OF THE SEA 5 (1986) [hereinafter "TRANSIT OF NUCLEAR-WEAPON BEAR-
ING VESSELS"]. Among these states are China, Denmark, Egypt, Indonesia (except for pas-
sage in designated sea lanes), Norway, Papau New Guinea and Turkey.
148. See TRANSIT OF NUCLEAR-WEAPON BEARING VESSELS, supra note 147:
Burma [sic], India and Vietnam prohibit alien warships and aircraft from mili-
tary warning zones 24 kilometers wide while Cambodia and Indonesia have
such zones 12 kilometers wide. China has a Military Warning Zone extending
at some points to 50 miles, North Korea has one out to 50 miles, South Korea.
. . one extending 150 miles in the Sea of Japan and 100 miles in the Yellow
Sea, and Nicaragua one extending 25 miles requiring 15 days advance notice by
foreign warships and planes. (citations ommitted).
Id. at 6.
149. Alexander, supra note 146, at 23.
150. Id. The Soviet Union doesn't recognize the principle of innocent passage for war-
ships at all. Butler, Soviet Concepts of Innocent Passage, 7 HARv. INT'L L.J. 113, 127 (1965);
Butler, The USSR and the Limits to National Jurisdiction over the Sea 1970-72, in LIMITS
TO NATIONAL JURISDICTION OVER THE SEA 177, 179, 189 (G. Yates & J. Young eds. 1974).
151. Sohn, International Navigation Interests Related to Security, Paper Presented at
the East-West Center/Law of the Sea Institute Conference on International Navigation
(Jan. 1986).
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stated objective of the regulations is to reduce the danger of pollution."' 5 2
Canada's requirements are especially significant in that Canada's exertion
of control could reach beyond the 200 mile EEZ limit. Canada also was
successful in including an article in UNCLOS III that allows states with
control over ice-covered territory to invoke special controls. 5 '
Clearly the law of the sea is not a singular and static paradigm of
law, either as customary international law or as codified in multilateral
treaties or conventions. Rather, it is constantly changing. Some suggest
the change may be dramatic. "We are living in a transitional period of
maritime affairs,"'' one commentator recently wrote. "We are seeing a
shift from a regime entirely dominated by the traditional maritime pow-
ers to one in which all coastal states (and even non-coastal states) de-
mand a bigger say in ocean affairs and claim greater rights .. .
The fact that transit passage became a part of UNCLOS III, though
not as the freedom of transit doctrine envisioned by its sponsors,'"8 the
United States and the Soviet Union, is evidence enough of that. Whereas
the United States and Soviet Union were pushing for virtually complete
freedom of navigation through international straits, 57 Indonesia, Malay-
sia and Singapore5 8 were ready to "de-internationalize' 1 59 the Malacca
152. LAW, FORCE AND DIPLOMACY, supra note 28, at 38-39 (citing E. Gold & D. John-
ston, Ship-generated Maritime Pollution: The Creator of Regulated Navigation, Paper
Presented at the 13th Annual Conference of the Law of the Sea Institute (Oct. 1979)).
153. UNCLOS III, supra note 27, art. 234, 21 I.L.M. 1245, at 1315. The full text of the
article reads as follows:
Coastal states have the right to adopt and enforce non-discriminatory laws and
regulations for the prevention, reduction and control of marine pollution from
vessels in ice-covered areas within the limits of the exclusive economic zone,
where particularly severe climatic conditions and the presence of ice covering
such areas for most of the year create obstructions or exceptional hazards to
navigation, and pollution of the marine environment could cause major harm
to or irreversible disturbance of the ecological balance. Such laws and regula-
tions shall have due regard to navigation and the protection and preservation
of the marine environment on the best available scientific evidence.
154. LAW, FORCE AND DIPLOMACY, supra note 28, at 38.
155. Id.
156. P. TANGSUBKUL, ASEAN AND THE LAW OF THE SEA 29 (1982).
157. Id. China, on the other hand, took the position that
straits lying within the territorial waters of a coastal state still come under the
national sovereignty of that state, even if they are often used for international
navigation .... China is of the view that the demand for freedom of transit
and freedom of overflight would allow the superpowers to treat the territorial
waters of other countries as the high seas purely because the aforesaid waters
are straits used for international navigation.
Id.
158. Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore border the Strait of Malacca and the nearby
Strait of Singapore.
159. The position of the three governments was stated in the Joint Statement on
"Straits of Malacca and Singapore," issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Malaysia
on November 16, 1971. Among its provisions, it stated that:
(i) the three governments agreed that the safety of navigation in the
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Strait, a principle passage between the Pacific and Indian Oceans. The
result is the compromise transit provisions now found in UNCLOS III,160
which provide for strait transit while allowing limited control by the
coastal state.'6 1
Reliance on UNCLOS III as the definitive "restatement" of the law
of the sea is troubling for another reason: it is not yet the law. The Con-
vention has not been ratified by the requisite sixty nations for it to enter
into force.16 The validity of UNCLOS III as international law will be
open to question so long as it has not yet formally entered into force, and
perhaps even after that point if major players refuse to ratify. Several key
nations have refused to sign or ratify the convention, most notably the
United States and the United Kingdom. Still, these states claim UN-
CLOS III to be customary international law except for the provisions
which they do not approve.'6 s Further, they claim the right to enforce
provisions of UNCLOS III against all other states, despite the fact that
they do not feel themselves compelled to honor all of its provisions.'
This posture may be seen as undermining the entire convention, at least
so far as it was designed to be an "all or nothing" package.'6 5
Straits of Malacca and Singapore is the responsibility of the coastal states
concerned;
(ii) the three governments agreed on the need for tripartite co-operation
on the safety of navigation in the two straits;
(iv) the three governments also agreed that the problem of the safety of
navigation and the question of internationalization of the Straits are two sepa-
rate issues;
(v) the governments of the Republic of Indonesia and of Malaysia agreed
that the Straits of Malacca and Singapore are not international straits, while
fully recognizing the principle of innocent passage. The Government of Singa-
pore takes note of the position of the governments of the Republic of Indonesia
and of Malaysia on this point ....
P. TANGSUBKUL, supra note 156, at 27.
The Philippines has also been a proponent of more restrictive rights of transit passage.
See e.g., Manansala, The Philippines and the Law of the Sea, 8 L. SEA INST. WORKSHOP
430, 430-41 (1987).
160. C. SANGER, supra note 20, at 88. Certain events had raised the level of concern
over this important link between the Pacific and Indian Oceans. During the war leading to
the formation of Bangladesh as a separate state, both the U.S. and Soviet Union sent war-
ships through the strait without the required notification. Id. at 86. Indonesia and Malaysia
were also very concerned about the possibility of a clash between nuclear submarines in the
strait. They and Singapore were also distressed at the growing pollution problem in their
waters, which was playing havoc with their fishing industries. Id. at 88.
161. See id.
162. As of July, 1988, only 35 states of the required 60 had ratified UNCLOS III, L. oF
THE SEA BULL., July 1988. UNCLOS III, supra note 27, art. 308(1), 21 I.L.M. 1245, at 1327.
163. TRANSIT OF NUCLEAR-WEAPON BEARING VESSELS, supra note 147, at 10.
164. Id.
165. Article 309 does not permit a ratification with reservation or exceptions unless
specifically provided for in the Convention. UNCLOS III, supra note 27, art. 309, 21 I.L.M.
1245, at 1327.
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To date, most states have not seen it in their best interest to evade or
spurn the provisions of UNCLOS III. In fact, many small coastal states"'
are heavily dependent on the seas and receive significant benefits from
UNCLOS III. These states may feel a compulsion to adhere to all provi-
sions of UNCLOS III as a matter of principle or practicality. As such,
they would be adhering to the spirit and intent of the convention negotia-
tions which took place under the premise that states would adopt the
complete treaty as a single, packaged unit.
In theory the unwillingness of the U.S. and U.K. to ratify UNCLOS
III provides signatory states with a basis to deny them and other non-
signatories the rights guaranteed by UNCLOS III. It appears that a state
is within its authority to prohibit "passage and overflight along sealanes
[sic] in archipelagoes and transit passage through straits within territorial
seas, arguing that these rights are not customary law and do not accrue to
non-signatories of UNCLOS. '1 6 7 Indonesia has expressed the position
that it has the right to "deny transit passage to those nations that have
not signed and adhered to [UNCLOS III]." 168 Nonetheless, most states
which have either ratified the convention or intend to honor it fully ex-
pect all other states to do similarly.
2. Specific Regimes of UNCLOS III and Nuclear Transit
Following the general discussion of the Law of the Sea above, it is
important to note that we review three specific regimes of UNCLOS III
which would be directly challenged by prohibition of nuclear transit. The
regimes implicated are innocent passage, transit passage and exclusive ec-
onomic zones. A subpart of this section will deal with each of these in
turn. A fourth subpart of this section looks at the future of UNCLOS.
(a) Innocent Passage
UNCLOS III provides that:
Passage is innocent so long as it is not prejudicial to the peace, good
order or security of the coastal State .... Passage of a foreign ship
shall be considered to be prejudicial to the peace, good order or secur-
ity of the coastal State if in the territorial sea it engages in . . . any
threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or
political independence of the coastal State .... '69
Though this language might at first indicate to the contrary, the defini-
tion itself provides the vehicle for a state to prevent nuclear transit
166. J. SEBENIUS, supra note 131.
167. TRANSIT OF NUCLEAR-WEAPON BEARING VESSELS, supra note 145, at 3; see Surace-
Smith, United States Activity Outside of the Law of the Sea Convention: Deep Seabed
Mining and Transit Passage, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1032, 1058 (1984).
168. Wisnomoert, Indonesia and the Law of the Sea, 8 L. SEA INST. WORKSHOP 392, 406
(1987).
169. UNCLOS III, supra note 27, art. 19(1)-(2)(a), 21 I.L.M. 1245, at 1274.
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within its territorial sea yet remain within the letter of the Law of the
Sea. That vehicle would be to declare, ipso facto, that the transit of nu-
clear weapon carrying or nuclear powered ships is "prejudicial to the
peace, good order or security" of the coastal state or parties to a nuclear
free zone treaty. Such a declaration would constitute recognition that
such transit could not be "innocent" by its very nature.7 0 Any nuclear
weapon carrying warship or aircraft (or, indeed, any warship or warplane
capable of carrying nuclear weapons) is a nuclear target regardless of its
locale. An attack on such a plane or ship would unleash the destructive
potential of a nuclear weapon against the state within whose territory the
ship or plane was transitting. Such an attack would obviously violate "the
sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of the coastal
State," even if the involved territory were not the intended target of the
attack.
This argument is not foreign to the international arena. As two Law
of the Sea chroniclers pointed out, "[s]ome states regard [nuclear pow-
ered] vessels as inherently threatening to their peace and good order.', 7'
As early as 1964 Spain passed legislation declaring "that the passage of
nuclear ships through territorial waters was to be considered an exception
to the right of innocent passage." ' More recently, the New Zealand For-
eign Ministry considered taking the position that the transit of nuclear
vessels can be inimical to a coastal state's "sovereignty, territorial integ-
rity or political independence" in its preparatory sessions for the South
Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty negotiations."a
Perhaps surprisingly, UNCLOS III does afford some recognition of
the dangers posed by nuclear fueled ships and those with nuclear cargo.
Such vessels are required to "observe special precautionary measures es-
tablished for such ships by international agreements""74 and may be
asked, when "exercising the right of innocent passage through [a coastal
state's] territorial sea[,] to use such sea lanes . . . as it may designate or
prescribe for the regulation of the passage of such ships. 1 "7 The question
for those ultimately concerned with the illegality of nuclear transit under
any condition is: Will future interpretations or revisions of the relevant
provisions of the Law of the Sea encompass that broader viewpoint? The
answer might be found in international fora that have convened in order
to study the problem of large-scale pollution.
170. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
171. R. CHURCHILL & A. LOWE, THE LAW OF THE SEA 70 (1983) [hereinafter "CHURCHILL
& LowE"].
172. Act No. 25/64, 29 April 1964, art. 7, UN Leg. Ser. B/16, p. 45 (reported in CHUR-
CHILL & LOWE, supra note 171, at 70).
173. The New Zealand Foreign Ministry ordered a legal study of this question prior to
concluding negotiations on the Treaty of Rarotonga. It apparently decided against taking
this position in order to conclude a treaty sufficiently favorable to the United States so as to
gain U.S. ratification of treaty protocols. See.supra note 72.
174. UNCLOS 11, supra note 27, art. 23, 21 I.L.M. 1245, at 1274-75.
175. Id. art. 22(1). See id. art. 22(2), 21 I.L.M. 1245, at 1274.
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One of six developments that the U.S. believes will be a near-future
addition to a revised UNCLOS III is an anti-pollution measure calling for
the "imposi[tion of] greater controls on navigation" within exclusive eco-
nomic zones.17 Such thinking is easily traced to the UNCLOS III negoti-
ations. It was in that forum that Indonesia and Malaysia decried severe
damage to the their fishing industries from massive oil tanker mishaps.
Due to that experience they have taken the position that "passage of su-
pertankers was non-innocent because the 'peace, good order and security
of the coastal state' were being prejudiced by environmental risks ....
The United States and other states considered the seriousness of this in-
terpretation to be sufficient to warrant modifying their demand for unfet-
tered strait transit.17 8
If states can effectively argue that the high risk to the environment
by potential polluters is a breach of the "peace, good order or security" of
a coastal state, as Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore have contended, it
is certainly valid for a state to take the position that the cataclysmal life
and society-threatening risk posed by nuclear transit is such a breach.
Indeed, this possibility was acknowledged in a United Nations study on
nuclear weapon free zones, which posited that the "question of innocent
passage" might be reconsidered "in light of the requirements necessary to
the effectiveness of [a nuclear weapon free] zone."'19
Restrictions upon the right of innocent passage are not without pre-
cedent. Over two dozen countries' require some sort of notification or
approval of the passage of foreign warships within their territorial sea,
including China and the Nordic countries. Despite the definition of inno-
cent passage found in UNCLOS III, the actions of these states may make
it "ieasonable to concede to a State the right to enact regulations regard-
ing the passage of foreign warships through its territorial waters, if con-
siderations based on its safety and protection justify it,"''8 particularly
176. Alexander, The Ocean Enclosure Movement: Inventory and Prospect, 20 SAN DI-
EGO L. REV. 561, 588-90 (1983).
177. C. SANGER, supra note 20, at 88. In statements made after the Joint Statement on
"Straits of Malacca and Singapore" was issued, supra note 159, the governments of Indone-
sia and Malaysia expressed specific concern about the problem of pollution. Indonesia took
the view that "[elvery nation has the right to protect the territorial waters from use by
other countries which could endanger the interest of its people, as by causing water pollu-
tion and damaging off-shore exploration and fishing industries." Statement of the Chief of
Staff of the Navy, May 19, 1972, quoted in P. TANGSUBKUL, supra note 156, at 27-28. The
Malaysian Prime Minister expressed a similar sentiment: "Indonesia and Malaysia have to
control the Straits of Malacca so that it will not be polluted by oil spills from tankers which
can and will destroy the fish and the shore of both countries." Opening Statement of the
23d UMNO (Government Party) Conference, May 1972, in id. at 28.
178. C. SANGER, supra note 20, at 88.
179. Comprehensive Study, supra note 7, at 49.
180. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
181. Janis, Dispute Settlement in the Law of the Sea Convention: The Military Activi-
ties Exception, 4 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 51, 54 (1977), (quoting C.J. COLOMBos, THE INTER-
NATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 223 (4th ed. 1961).
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when that state takes the legal position that the presence of nuclear
weapons cannot be "innocent."
(b) Transit Passage
The rationale for imposing restrictions on nuclear transit through the
territorial sea are equally applicable to international straits. Whatever the
potential dangers to a coastal state from an incident in its territorial sea,
they are magnified in a strait. For example, a strait's narrowness and
shallowness leave less room for error. These factors combined with the
often heavy traffic passing through a strait' bring vessels closer to land
and increase the chance for collision or grounding. Further, the impor-
tance of international straits to the nuclear powers' 83 - and the frequent
crossings their vessels make - presents a considerable risk of nuclear
confrontation within straits.'
The concept of strait transit as a doctrine of international law was
originally promoted as a regime of free passage through international
straits.'85 Pressure by states bordering straits 88 ("straits states") such as
Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Spain resulted in some weakening of
the free passage proposal. Still, the strait transit provisions of UNCLOS
III, as enacted, served to prevent straits states from exercising complete
sovereignty over what would otherwise be their territorial seas when that
territorial sea comprised an international strait. Under UNCLOS III, any
ship or aircraft is permitted unfettered passage when exercising continu-
ous and expedient transit. 187 This is a weaker standard (from the point of
view of straits states) than innocent passage.' 8 Objecting to the severe
restraints on their rights, several key straits states, among them Spain
and Morocco (Strait of Gibraltar), Oman (Strait of Hormuz) and Indone-
182. E.g., 5000 vessels per month through the Strait of Malacca. P. TANGSUBKUL, supra
note 156, at 25 (citing P. TANGSUBKUL, AN ASIAN VIEWPOINT ON THE STATUS OF STRAITS IN
EAST ASIA (1974)).
183. "The United States is especially dependent upon these archipelagic waters and
international straits [of Indonesia and Malaysia] for the transit of its submarines to and
from Guam and Subic Bay [the Philippines] to Diego Garcia [the U.S. naval base on an
island in the central Indian Ocean]." Larson, Innocent, Transit, and Archipelagic Sea
Lanes Passage, 18 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 411, 417 (1987). See infra note 191.
184. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
185. See supra note 156 and accompanying text. For detailed descriptions of the ad-
vance of the transit passage concept, many sources can be cited, including CHURCHILL &
LOWE, supra note 171, at 81-89; LAW, FORCE AND DIPLOMACY, supra note 28, at 97-113;
Kuribayashi, The New Law of the Sea and the Straits of Malacca, in INTERNATIONAL SYM-
POSIUM ON THE NEW LAW OF THE SEA IN SOUTHEAST ASIA: DEVELOPMENTAL EFFECTS AND RE-
GIONAL APPROACHES 146 (D.M. Johnson, E. Gold & P. Tangsubkul eds. 1983).
The journal Ocean Development and International Law recently published an entire
issue devoted to the subject of transit passage. 18 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 391-496 (1987).
186. See supra notes 158-61 and accompanying text.
187. Id. at 125-27. See UNCLOS III, supra note 27, art. 37-38.
188. See infra note 191 and accompanying text.
1990
DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
sia (Straits of Malacca and Lombok) '" have declared that they will em-
ploy the innocent passage regime, not recognizing transit passage. This
issue is of particular interest to an ASEAN nuclear free zone190 where the
straits providing the most expeditious and traveled access between the
Pacific and Indian Oceans are located. 91
The right of transit passage is similar to the right of innocent passage
found in the territorial sea regime. Ships and aircraft exercising the right
of transit passage are required to "refrain from any threat or use of force
against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of
States bordering the strait . . . .'"' However, the strait state is not re-
served the express right to expel a ship whose passage is non-innocent
(i.e., prejudices the "peace, good order or security" of the coastal state).91
The transit passage regime contains another provision which could
be invoked against nuclear-powered vessels and those with nuclear car-
goes. In cases in which the environment is threatened, Article 233 of UN-
CLOS III allows coastal states to "take appropriate enforcement mea-
sures" against vessels "causing or threatening major damage to the
189. Surace-Smith, supra note 167, at 1033.
190. The ASEAN states may well be among the next nation groups to promulgate a
nuclear free zone. See Fry, supra note 6, at 69-71. During the December 1987 ASEAN sum-
mit in Manila, Indonesian President Suharto called for an ASEAN nuclear free zone. In the
end a paragraph in the final declaration of the summit stated that "ASEAN would intensify
its efforts toward the early establishment of a Southeast Asian nuclear weapon free zone...
." Vatikiotis, Zone of Discord: Nuclear-Free Proposal Likely to Split Allies, FAR E. EcON.
REv., Jan. 14, 1988, at 12.
More recently the ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary Organisation, while calling for its mem-
bers to work for an Indian Ocean Zone of Peace, stressed the need to complete drafting of
its own nuclear free zone treaty as soon as possible. Other Reports: ASEAN Parliamentari-
ans Call for Nuclear Free Zone, Summary of World Broadcasts (BBC), Aug. 26, 1989.
ASEAN leaders have also called upon the removal of all military bases and nuclear weapons
from their region. ASEAN Legislators Want Orderly Withdrawl of Foreign Bases, Reuters,
Aug. 25, 1989.
191. The United States perceives strait transit to be of critical strategic concern to its
national defense:
If straits states such as . . . Indonesia and Malaysia were able to restrict the
movement of U.S. carrier forces for reasons of their own determinations of na-
tional security, the effectiveness of the U.S. nuclear commitment could be
threatened especially in times of crisis, [at] precisely the time when straits
states would be under the most pressure, internal and external, to limit
passage.
Janis, supra note 181, at 58.
The sincerity of such claims by the U.S. is doubted by some. For example, it has been
suggested that "the advent of the Ohio class SSBNs (submarines with ballistic missiles) and
the Trident I/C4 SLBMs (submarine-launched ballistic missiles), with an estimated range
from 4,500-6,500 nautical miles . . . 'would virtually eliminate the dependence of the U.S.
underwater nuclear force on passage through international straits.'" Larson, supra note 183,
at 424 (quoting R. OSGOOD, TOWARD A NATIONAL OCEAN POLICY, 1976 AND BEYOND 47-48
(1976)).
192. UNCLOS III, supra note 27, art. 39(1)(b).
193. See Wisnomoert, supra note 168, at 404.
VOL. 18:2
CREATING A NUCLEAR FREE ZONE TREATY
marine environment of the straits . ". . ."10 This explicit recognition of the
straits (and other coastal) states' valid environmental concerns'" should
provide straits states with the means to enforce the same kinds of anti-
pollution/anti-nuclear mechanisms, and with at least the same justifica-
tion, as with cases involving innocent passage.'"
(c) Exclusive Economic Zones
On the surface, a solution to the question of how to prohibit nuclear
transit through exclusive economic zones is not straightforward. Coastal
states do not have any explicit rights over the movement of foreign ships
and aircraft through the 200 mile exclusive economic zone which is de-
clared197 to be part of the high seas. Moreover, there is no obligation on
the part of foreign vessels or aircraft to refrain from activities which
might "prejudice the peace, good order or security" of the coastal state or
to refrain from "causing or threatening major damage to the environ-
ment."'"" However, UNCLOS III does specify that the "coastal State has
sovereign rights for the purpose of... conserving and managing the natu-
ral resources" in the exclusive economic zone 99 and has "jurisdiction ...
with regard to ... the protection and preservation of the marine environ-
ment."200 Furthermore, UNCLOS III calls for "compl[iance] with the laws
and regulations adopted by the coastal State in accordance with" these
provisions. 20 1 This set of rules provides a potentially effective means to
prohibit nuclear transit through the EEZ while remaining within the
framework of UNCLOS III.
The dangers to the environment of radioactive pollution are well
known.20 2 It is not an indefensible position that the transit of any radio-
active materials through the exclusive economic zone creates an unaccept-
able risk to the conservation, management, protection and preservation of
the marine environment. There are inherent dangers in the transporta-
tion of radioactive substances including the potential for accidents at
sea203 or in the air 204 that could result in the exposure to the marine envi-
194. UNCLOS III, supra note 27, art. 233
195. See supra notes 152-53, 160 and accompanying text.
196. See infra § III.A.
197. UNCLOS III, supra note 27, art. 135.
198. See id. art. 56.
199. UNCLOS III, supra note 27, art. 56(1)(a).
200. Id. art. 56(1)(b)(iii).
201. Id. art. 58(3).
202. See, e.g., E. COLGLAZIER, JR., THE POLITICS OF NUCLEAR WASTE (1982).
203. To date seven nuclear-powered submarines have sunk, releasing radiation into the
sea, and the crew of another nuclear submarine died of radiation poisoning following an
accident. Broder & Healy, Soviet Submarine Sinks Off Norway: Nuclear-Driven Craft Goes
Down After Fire; 'Major Loss of Life' Reported, L.A. Times, Apr. 8, 1989, § 1, at 1, col. 5. It
has been argued that the radiation released from those sinkings was not enough to "produce
a big effect." Id. quoting J. Holdren, professor of energy and resources at Univ. Calif. at
Berkeley. But the sinking of an experimental Soviet nuclear submarine in April 1989 off
Norway is "basically . . . big trouble," according to the same expert. Ybarra, Experimental
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ronment of radioactive substances. The lax attitude of the maritime in-
dustry toward disposing of and illegally dumping radioactive wastes at
sea205 is an existing source of serious radioactive pollution.
The possibility of sealing off EEZs to nuclear transit is not an ab-
stract vision. As the Law of the Sea now stands,
[t]he coastal State has the right, within its EEZ, to adopt non-dis-
criminatory rules and standards against vessel-source pollution and to
enforce these when necessary .... [A] number of coastal States have
already adopted domestic legislation with regard to vessel-source pol-
lution which is more severe than the rules and regulations of the In-
ternational Maritime Organization Convention. The passage of "po-
tential polluters," such as nuclear-powered vessels, vessels carrying
nuclear of other "hazardous" cargoes, and ammunition ships, through
the EEZs of some coastal States, may in time be jeopardized, treaty or
no treaty."°6
System on Sunken Sub May Pose Radiation Threat, L.A. Times, Apr. 9, 1989, § 1, at 11,
col. 1, quoting J. Holdren. The submarine's metallic sodium-cooler, which cools the reactors,
is highly explosive when it comes into contact with water, an event which would lead to
massive release of the reactors' radioactive fuel.
Altogether, over half of the worlds' nuclear reactors are aboard submarines and nuclear-
powered surface craft, "which is the most dangerous place for them to be." Tuohy & Parks,
No Sub Radiation Peril Soviets Say: Gorbachev Reassures World Leaders; More than 60
Feared Lost in Sinking, L.A. Times, Apr. 9, 1989, § 1, at 1, col. 5, quoting Darnian Durrant
of the environmental group Greenpeace. The other concern posed by these vessels are their
nuclear weapons, which can also leach their radioactivity into the water following an acci-
dent at sea.
204. The dangers of a crash of a plane carrying nuclear weapons might be exemplified
by the return to earth of nuclear-powered satellites. In 1979, Cosmos 924 crashed over a
wide area of Canada, contaminating 40,000 square miles. When Cosmos 1900 was expected
to burn up on re-entry in 1988, officials blithely admitted that "everyone in the world will
be exposed to the radioactivity." Treen, Nuclear Crash, THE NATION, Oct. 3. 1988, at 261.
Of greater concern is the radioactivity which would be released if a space shuttle carry-
ing a plutonium-powered satellite exploded, as did the Challenger in 1986. Nuclear Debris
Could Be Released in Shuttle/Centaur Explosion, AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY,
Mar. 10, 1986, at 288. Plutonium is the deadliest substance known. See infra notes 239-40
and accompanying text.
205. See, e.g., Boehmer-Christiansen, An End to Radioactive Disposal at Sea?, J.
MARINE POL'Y 119 (Apr. 1986); Van Dyke, Ocean Disposal of Nuclear Wastes, J. MARINE
POL'Y 82 (Apr. 1988).
206. Alexander, supra note 176, at 585-86 (quoting Burke, National Legislation on
Ocean Authority Zones and the Contemporary Law of the Sea, 9 OCEAN DEv. & INT'L L.
289, 289-322 (1981)). This United States government officer's argument relies, in part on
two sections of art. 211 of UNCLOS III, supra note 27. Art. 211(4) allows that:
Coastal States may, in the exercise of their sovereignty within their territorial
sea, adopt laws and regulations for the prevention, reduction and control of
marine pollution from foreign vessels, including vessels exercising the right of
innocent passage. Such laws and regulations shall, in accordance with Part II,
section 3, not hamper innocent passage of foreign vessels.
Art. 211(5) provides that:
Coastal States, for the purpose of enforcement as provided for in section 6,
may in respect of their exclusive economic zones adopt laws and regulations for
the prevention, reduction and control of pollution from vessels conforming to
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As long as the law is evolving, maritime parties can expect coastal
states to attempt to enforce new provisions to protect their resources. A
Soviet participant in law of the sea negotiations has reasoned that
the practical and legal evolution of the EEZ concept will not be with-
out dispute .... It is likely, for example, that some coastal states will
undertake actions and enact legislation which will interfere with the
rights expected by naval powers in EEZs; they will claim that they are
acting in the interests of good order at sea and in accordance with




It is impossible to predict whether future Law of the Sea Conven-
tions will incorporate any of the proposals suggested above and in the
Model Nuclear Free Zone Treaty. What is evident, however, is that "[t]he
system of norms and principles of international law is in constant move-
ment. Some norms and principles are just being born, others have been
formed, and yet others are dying out."20 8 Like the recognition of the EEZ
by the Third Convention on the Law of the Sea, those developing norms
will eventually find their way into international acceptance.
The stage is being set for the expansion of environmental controls
and protective rights by coastal states within their territorial seas,2", in-
ternational straits21 0 and EEZs.21 ' Even at this early date it has been pos-
ited that
[t]he problem of ecological security is closely linked with the human
right to a healthy environment and the respective obligations of
states. The concept of ecological security has begun to be filled with
real substance with the internationalization of the problem of the en-
vironment in international relations as an objective process, that is,
the aspiration of every country to guard its natural environment and
the health of its people against damage which might be caused as a
result of the "anti-ecological" activities of other countries." '
Another development in this evolutionary process is the effort by
anti-nuclear forces to advance the claim of the Spanish legislature "that
the passage of nuclear ships through territorial waters [is] to be consid-
ered an exception to the right of innocent passage."'2 13 This approach can
and giving effect to generally accepted international rules and standards estab-
lished through the competent international organization or general diplomatic
conference.
207. N. Rusina, supra note 31, at 262.
208. LAW, FORCE AND DIPLOMACY, supra note 28, at 43.
209. See supra subpart (a) of this section.
210. See supra subpart (b) of this section.
211. See supra subpart (c) of this section.
212. N. RUSINA, supra note 31, at 269.
213. Act No. 25/64, Apr. 29, 1964, art. 7, UN Leg. Ser. B/16, p. 45, reported in id. at 70.
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be most effective within the framework of the territorial sea, where inno-
cent passage is the current regime.214 It would also be easily workable
among the several straits states which employ innocent passage instead of
the regime of transit passage recently adopted by the yet-to-be activated
UNCLOS 111.215 Some countries have already adopted such a stand, most
notably New Zealand, which has banned port visits by nuclear capable
vessels.21
6
The movement of norms and principles may play a large role in the
strait transit area, as well. The transit passage regime, though weaker
than they originally sought, favors the strongest naval powers.2"7 As the
strength and determination of the less powerful coastal states increases,
the resistance to the nuclear powers' attempt to install a regime of free-
dom of the sea through international straits will grow. The advancement
of the Law of the Sea may also, one day, affect the transit passage re-
gime's requirement that shipping and aircraft passing through or over an
international strait "refrain from any threat or use of force against the
sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of States bor-
dering the strait .... -"28 Is it not conceivable that nuclear transit could
be viewed as a violation of this provision?
3. Voluntary Compliance
In the final analysis, compliance with new Law of the Sea provisions,
or nuclear prohibitory interpretations of the current Law of the Sea, will
most likely be voluntary. Treaties are substantially honored through in-
ternational pressure and self-interest.2 9 Where a nuclear free zone treaty
is the vehicle by which nuclear transit is prohibited, there is an institu-
tional form of voluntary compliance: each nuclear power would be asked
to sign a protocol. Such protocols attempt to assure that the nuclear pow-
ers would honor the respective nuclear free zone treaty's prohibition on
nuclear transit throughout the zone, whether it included just the territo-
rial sea, EEZ, or an entire region of the open ocean. This is the theory of
the protocols to the Tlatelolco and Rarotonga Treaties.
See supra notes 172-73 and accompanying text.
214. UNCLOS III, supra note 27, arts. 17-32. One commentator posits that change will
come as cultural norms change. "If States believe that nuclear weapons are illegal, and that
NFZs (nuclear weapons free zones) present a hope for world peace, cultural norms will grad-
ually develop into legal norms against nuclear armaments." McFadden, Nuclear Weapon
Free Zones: Toward an International Framework, 16 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 217, 249 (1986).
215. See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
216. See infra note 99 and accompanying text.
217. See supra notes 156-61 and accompanying text.
218. UNCLOS III, supra note 27, art. 39(1)(b).
219. The doctrine of pacta sunt servanda (treaties are to be observed) arose out of the
Peace of Westphalia ending the Thirty Years' War in 1648. T. BUERGENTHAL & H. MAIER,
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW IN A NUTSHELL 16 (1985). Despite machinery designed to enforce
treaty obligations included in most treaties since then, no nation will honor a treaty if to do
so would result in its own detriment.
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In the case of a nuclear prohibitory treaty or protocol, compliance
does not have to rely on good faith alone. Instead, it may well be assumed
that the nuclear powers would monitor compliance by one another pro-
viding an indirect method of verification. A ban on port or airfield visits
included in such a treaty or protocol would, if honored, create de facto
compliance.
B. Nuclear Weapons, Alliances with Nuclear Powers and C3I
Assuming the Treaty of Rarotonga to be a minimum standard to
which future nuclear free zone treaties will adhere, the manufacture, pos-
session, testing, storage, deployment and use of nuclear explosive devices
of any type will be prohibited by such treaties.2 20 The Rarotonga prohibi-
tions do not, however, apply to activities of assistance, cooperation and
participation in support systems for nuclear weapons. Australia, a party
to the South Pacific accord, cooperates and co-manages 2 with the
United States several so-called C3 1,2 2 or Command, Control, Communica-
tion and Intelligence installations, which are part of the U.S. defense net-
work, helping to monitor and manage the location and activities of Amer-
ican and other forces throughout the Indian Ocean, East Asia and South
Pacific regions.22 As Michael Hamel-Green points out in the commentary
to his treaty for FANG, such facilities are "integral parts of nuclear-
warfighting [sic] systems and are generally considered to be prime nuclear
targets in any nuclear hostilities, "224 an irony acknowledged by Australian
officials.22
5
Such systems might also serve as part of the conventional defense of
the "host" state.22 Nonetheless, if an objective of a nuclear free zone is to
220. Treaty of Rarotonga, supra note 3, arts. 3-6, at 1444-46.
221. U.S. Reaffirms Military Role in Pacific, Reuters, Nov. 4, 1989; R. BABBAGE, RE-
THINKING AUSTRALIA'S DEFENCE 40, 92-99, 241, 244 (1980); C. Bell, ANZUS in Australia's
Foreign and Security Policies, in AUSTRALIA'S FOREIGN & SECURITY POLICIES 136 (J.
Bercovith ed. 1988). America's major C3I installations in Australia are located at North-
West Cape, Nurrungar and Pine Gap. Id. at 154.
222. M. Hamel-Green, supra note 66, at 3. See Command, Control, Communications
and Intelligence, Sci. AM., January 1985, at 32 [hereinafter "Sci. AM."].
223. See R. BABBAGE, supra note 221; M. O'CONNOR, To LIVE IN PEACE: AUSTRALIA'S
DEFENCE POLICY (1985); ScI. AM., supra note 222.
224. M. Hamel-Green, supra note 66, at 3. Michael Hamel-Green is not the only com-
mentator to suggest this irony. Coral Bell notes that "the most vital of all Australia's vital
national interests is the preservation of peace between the central balance powers. And this
is also the most endangered of Australia's vital interests ...." C. Bell, supra note 221, at
152 (emphasis in original). Thus, while Australia's greatest threat is from nuclear war, it
believes it must also be a participant in that same risk in order to help preserve the balance
of power.
225. Confidential interviews with officials of the Foreign Ministry of Australia, see
supra note 71.
226. C. Bell, supra note 221, at 150. However, Bell asserts that "[t]he American connec-
tion is useful but not essential to Australia in low-level threats. It would be vital in coping
with internal level threats, but the help required would be more in the field of diplomacy,
backing, supplies and intelligence than in combat forces .... Id.
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insure that the region not be a nuclear target, then one must ask, How
can the maintenance of such installations comport?
Of course, if Australia or any other state in a similar position were to
disband C2I facilities, the U.S. (or any other nuclear power in a similar
position) would almost certainly object, 27 claiming that it cannot main-
tain its nuclear deterrent or its defense obligations to the host nation if
the installation were to be removed. Such a claim puts a state desirous of
being non-nuclear in a dilemma of sorts as long as there is tension be-
tween nuclear powers. If it rids itself of the danger of attack to the C2 I
facilities located on its soil, it also risks losing the protections of its de-
fense alliance with the Western or Soviet bloc.
A second question inseparable from the C2I issue must also be con-
sidered. Should a nuclear free zone treaty prohibit treaty Parties from
joining alliances with nuclear powers?229 There are several questions the
non-nuclear state may want to attempt to answer. What protection is ac-
tually provided by that alliance? Is the danger of nuclear attack, if nu-
clear free provisions are not enforced, greater than the danger of external
attack should that alliance disband? Is there a strong non-nuclear state
within the nuclear free zone that can aid in the defense of the smaller or
weaker states against outside conventional forces, and at what cost? Is
this defensive aid desirable? Can the strength of the new alliance created
by the nuclear free zone treaty serve as a deterrent from outside attack?
Is a conventional deterrent more effective for defense purposes than reli-
ance on a nuclear state for protection?
The treaty proposed by the Fiji Anti-Nuclear Group.2 9 would pro-
hibit "entering into military alliance arrangements with nuclear weapon
states under which nuclear weapons would be used in defense of or with
the cooperation of any Contracting Party."'2 30 A more radical approach
would be to ban all defense alliances with nuclear states. Such an ap-
proach might well be unnecessary if the parties to an alliance involving
one or more nuclear powers made it explicit that nuclear weapons would
not be used in the defense of the non-nuclear state. This agreement
would presumably provide greater assurance of freedom from nuclear at-
tack by the opposing nuclear state, due to the diminished threat of attack
from that region, though such an agreement has speculative effect at best.
The nearest thing to a precedent may be "negative assurances" '231
227. In an analogous situation, the United States suspended the ANZUS alliance as
regards New Zealand following New Zealand's ban on port visits by nuclear capable vessels.
See infra note 99 and accompanying text.
228. Michael Hamel-Green's Draft Treaty for a Comprehensive Nuclear Free Zone in
the South Pacific, prepared for the Fiji Anti-Nuclear Group, calls for the prohibition of any
"military arrangements with nuclear weapon states under which nuclear weapons would be
used in defense of or with the cooperation of any Contracting Party." Art. 1(f). Text can be
found in M. Hamel-Green, supra note 66.
229. FANG Treaty, supra note 68.
230. Id. art. 1(f).
231. Kennedy Graham, a disarmament ambassador for New Zealand, spells out three
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whereby nuclear powers have declared not to use nuclear weapons against
non-nuclear states, as is the case with a protocol to the Treaty of
Tlatelolco. 82 However, the United States has made it clear that it could
not abide by such a proviso,23 thereby withdrawing its defense obliga-
tions to New Zealand following that country's nuclear port ban. 234
For negotiators of future nuclear free zone treaties this may be one of
the most difficult issues. The pragmatist might say that the nuclear pow-
ers cannot be ignored. Even truly neutral countries may feel threatened
by one or the other of the nuclear states or their proxy. Defense alliances
may at worst be a "necessary evil." But as New Zealand 23" and the draft-
ers of Palau's Constitution 230 have asserted, there may be no need for
such alliances to rely on nuclear weapons.
Still there exists the question of what should future negotiators do
regarding CM1 and similar facilities? Their use and value for non-nuclear,
weapons-related defense and mobility purposes can be great, if not vital.
Similarly, even the most basic of such systems, intended and normally
used for non-nuclear purposes, could be utilized for monitoring and com-
municating with nuclear weapons.
Thus, any approach which did not completely ban electronic surveil-
forms that negative assurances can take:
1. A 'total non-use' pledge never to use nuclear weapons against any state at
any time or under any circumstances.
2. A 'non-first strike' and a 'non-first use' pledge between nuclear powers in
which one undertakes never to be the first to 'use nuclear weapons against an-
other. A non-first strike pledge excludes the use of nuclear weapons in the
form of the first offensive move of war. A non-first use pledge excludes their
initial employment in response to aggression by conventional forces. Either of
these pledges can be of two kinds:
(a) a total pledge, in which the nuclear power applies the pledge to all
other nuclear powers; or
(b) a partial pledge, in which the nuclear power extends the pledge to cer-
tain other nuclear powers but not to all.
3. The more general 'non-use' understanding extended to non-nuclear weapon
states. This can similarly be of two kinds:
(a) a total undertaking, in which the nuclear power forswears the use of
nuclear weapons to all non-nuclear weapon states under any circumstances;
(b) a partial (or conditional) undertaking, in which the nuclear power
agrees not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states under
certain circumstances, or on certain conditions. There are a number of varia-
tions of condition 'non-use' undertakings, depending on the circumstances and
the conditions stipulated.
Graham, supra note 84, at 281. See infra note 19 and accompanying text.
232. Treaty of Tlatelolco, supra note 5, protocol II, art. 3, at 364. The Treaty of Raro-
tonga contains a similar protocol, Treaty of Rarotonga, supra note 3, protocol 2, art. 2, at
1461, but only China and the U.S.S.R have signed protocol instruments. See supra notes 69-
82 and accompanying text.
233. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
234. See infra note 99.
235. See Glover, supra note 19; see also infra, note 99.
236. See supra notes 86-93 and accompanying text.
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lance, monitoring and command facilities would almost certainly be unen-
forceable. A better, though not completely satisfactory, approach would
be to prevent such facilities located within the zone from being used for
any activity in relation to nuclear weapons. Instead of banning such facil-
ities altogether, it would rely on the good faith of the states to uphold the
intent of the treaty. And it does, at least, acknowledge the dilemma posed
by such facilities. In a nuclear episode the net result just might be the
sparing of the facility - and the "host" state - from nuclear attack.
C. Peaceful Nuclear Activities
It is both impossible to assure that any nuclear explosive device will
only be used for peaceful purposes and to guarantee that the use of such
a device will not result in any risk to life or property. The Rarotonga
Treaty simply bans all nuclear explosive devices.28 7 But what of other al-
legedly peaceful nuclear purposes?
Virtually no one denies that the use of radioactive materials for med-
ical and limited non-military research purposes is valid and acceptable.
However, at what point does non-military scientific nuclear research cross
the line to become military research? This is a distinction which authori-
ties and watchdogs may want to watch closely, yet these may be beneficial
uses even the most ardent foes of nuclear activity would not prohibit.2"'
Nuclear power plants present a possible problem for some states
wishing to go nuclear free. Huge amounts of foreign exchange may have
been invested in the reactors.289 Yet many states which do have nuclear
power plants have publicly acknowledged the extraordinarily heavy finan-
cial, environmental and social burden which they impose on their people.
Such an acknowledgement may have led to the closing down of the brand
new reactor in the Philippines24 and the phase-out of nuclear power
plants undertaken in Sweden as early as 1980.241
Nuclear power plants also pose nuclear proliferation dangers. Waste
material from reactors contains weapons-usable plutonium which, 24 2 if
reprocessed, could be utilized in nuclear weapons.248 Moreover, fissionable
wastes from nuclear power plants are known to be susceptible to diver-
sion.2 " Nuclear power plants are also subject to terrorist attack and could
237. Treaty of Rarotonga, supra note 3, art. 3, at 1444-45.
238. See, e.g., M. Hamel-Green, supra note 66, at 3-4.
239. For example, the Philippine nuclear reactor which President Aquino shut down
prior to its launching cost her country more than $2 billion in hard currency. Dumaine,
supra note 97.
240. Id.
241. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
242. R. NADER & J. ABBOTrs, THE MENACE OF ATOMIC ENERGY 78-81.
243. Id.
244. E.g., Pakistan and India have avoided or bypassed international nuclear safe-
guards and supervision, resulting in both countries having the facilities and nuclear material
to construct significant quantities of nuclear weapons. L. SPECTOR, supra note 16, at 73-124.
Similar allegations involving Israel have been commonplace for several years. Id. at 130-45.
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be held for political ransom.2 45 In 1990 the justification for new nuclear
power plant construction in most, if not all situations, and even the oper-
ation of many existing nuclear power plants, is nil.
Recent years have seen a growth in consumer and industrial uses of
radioactive substances. Examples include smoke detectors, food irradia-
tion and sterilization by irradiation.24 6 Of course, there is a risk of radio-
active contamination with these products, as with all nuclear products.
That risk is magnified by the greater dissemination of radioactive materi-
als which will necessarily occur as food irradiation plants are built and
operated,24 7 not to mention the radioactive waste materials produced by
these irradiation facilities.2 48 Furthermore, the material used by food irra-
diation plants, for example, is a direct by-product of weapons-grade nu-
clear fuel production. 4 9 A risk completely different in nature is intimated
by medical research which links irradiated foods to increased incidence of
cancer and other diseases in humans.2 50 A truly comprehensive nuclear
free zone should at least consider restrictions on the great many of these
activities and products. A reasonable approach would be to ban all nu-
clear activities except those for which there is both a minimal societal
benefit and no non-nuclear substitute.
D. Radioactive Waste Disposal
The London Convention 25 1 prohibits the disposal of high level radio-
active wastes at sea,2 5 2 and since 1983 there has been an international
moratorium"' on the dumping of all radioactive wastes at sea. In no way
should this be seen as a permanent device for ocean protection. The 1983
245. See generally, P. LEVENTHAL & Y. ALEXANDER, PREVENTING NUCLEAR TERRORISM
(1987).
246. Among non-food items which are irradiated presumably for sterilization purposes
are "blood agar and plasma, blankets and towels, bottles, cosmetics, needles, infant wear,
peat moss, sanitary napkins and tampons, lubricating jelly, scalpel blades, and water ......
Gibbs, Zap, Crackle, Pop, THE PROGRESSIVE, Sept. 1987, at 22, 24. Labels are not required
for any irradiated products. Irradiation Business Gears Up, UTNE READER, May - June
1987, at 29-30 [hereinafter "UTNE"]. A former federal law requiring labeling of unprocessed
whole foods, Gibbs, supra, expired in 1988. See also UTNE, supra.
247. Terry, Why Is D.O.E. for Food Irradiation?, THE NATION, Feb. 7, 1987, at 142.
Although irradiation is a young business, there have already been significant radioactive
spills, sloppy record keeping and other willful violations of safety regulations. Id.; UTNE,
supra note 246.
248. Terry, supra note 247, at 142.
249. Id.
250. One study found an 80% incidence of a white blood cell anomaly, polyploidy, re-
lated to immune system disorders among children who ate products made from irradiated
wheat. Gibbs, supra note 246, at 22-23. Animal studies have demonstrated genetic muta-
tions among flies and mice fed irradiated food. Id. at 23.
251. Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and
Other Matter, opened for signature Dec. 29, 1972, 26 U.S.T. 2403, T.I.A.S. No. 8165.
252. Id.
253. Boehmer-Christiansen, supra note 205; Van Dyke, supra note 205.
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moratorium is currently under review254 in the hope (by the nuclear ex-
porting and waste producing countries) that its protections will be
weakened.
South Pacific Forum states have chosen not to permit such a slacken-
ing to occur in their seas. The Treaty of Rarotonga institutionalized the
1983 moratorium's ban for the South Pacific.2 5 A year later it was en-
hanced with the conclusion of the Convention for the Protection of the
Natural Resources and Environment of the South Pacific Region, signed
in 1986.25' The seas of the South Pacific may now be free from radioactive
pollution, but what of the rest of the world? Certainly any nuclear free
zone should incorporate similar prohibitions.
Likewise, the disposal or storage of nuclear wastes anywhere in the
vicinity of a watershed, or proximate to an alluvial deposit, should be
strictly prohibited. Currently there is no known safe method of radioac-
tive disposal. Until a safe method of storage or disposal is discovered,
such products should be kept to a minimum, and where they do exist, the
surest and safest alternative is to require users of such materials to store
them in a nearby facility affording the maximum possible containment,
monitorability and retrievability. Ideally, such facilities would be located
near the largest sources of high level radioactive wastes in order to mini-
mize the chance of spillage or loss when wastes are transported to storage
facilities.
The net result is that future nuclear free zone treaties would be best
to ban all storage or disposal except in monitored, retrievable storage fa-
cilities until an acknowledged safe method of disposal is discovered and
in use. In the meantime, the world (or a nuclear free zone) would do best
to bring the production of such materials to absolutely minimal levels
(i.e., necessary medical and scientific uses only).
E. Nuclear State Compliance
The extant nuclear free zone treaties have sought to obtain explicit
nuclear powers accession to the relevant parts of these treaties through
protocols. This device has been accepted by the nuclear powers, given the
requirement that nuclear free zones be regional undertakings.2 57 The first
of the two common protocols to the two extant treaties calls for adher-
ence to the relevant principles of the treaties by extra-regional states
which have iriternational responsibility for territory within the region.2 8
254. Id.
255. Treaty of Rarotonga, supra note 3, art. 7, at 1447.
256. SPREP, supra note 52.
257. One of eight guidelines for the establishment of a nuclear weapon free zone, agreed
upon by the parties to the United Nations study on the subject, is that "[tihe initiative for
the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone should come from States within the region con-
cerned, and participation must be voluntary." Comprehensive Study, supra note 7, at 31.
258. Treaty of Tlatelolco, supra note 5, protocols 1, II, art. 2, at 360, 364; Treaty of
Rarotonga, supra note 3, protocol 1, art. 1, at 1459, and protocol 2, art. 2, at 1461.
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The second seeks assurance that the nuclear states will not assist any
treaty party in violating a provision of the treaty as well a promise not to
use nuclear weapons against treaty parties. 59 The Rarotonga Treaty in-
cludes a unique third protocol which asks nuclear states to refrain from
testing nuclear explosive devices throughout the region.
260
Additional protocols could be devised to obtain nuclear state acces-
sion to a broader range of treaty provisions. For example, being that the
nuclear transit questions are likely to be among the most difficult to en-
force, a pragmatic solution would be to attempt to secure a nuclear power
agreement to honor any such provisions contained in the treaty, as pro-
posed in Section III(A)(5) hereof.
Another possible protocol could seek nuclear power assurances that
they would not test nuclear capable delivery vehicles anywhere within the
zone. The working group to the SPNFZ expressed concern over the in-
creasing frequency of missile tests throughout the Pacific. " ' Such a pro-
tocol, however, raises two difficulties. It could be validly argued that the
same missiles which propel nuclear warheads can also be used to deliver
conventional warheads and satellites. Thus, perhaps intention is the only
way to distinguish acceptable versus unacceptable delivery systems. As to
the raison d'etre of such a protocol, it is not beyond the ken for a nuclear
free zone treaty to take whatever actions it can which may slow down the
growth in the global nuclear arms race. Certainly such a goal might fall
within the treaty's scope.
IV. THE MODEL NUCLEAR FREE ZONE TREATY
The Model Treaty (which appears in full in the Appendix to this
article) is one possible ideal approach. Its individual provisions will ap-
pear to some as reasonable objectives and to others as anti-nuclear ex-
tremes. If considered by any given nation-group somewhere in the world,
it may or may not find them pragmatic. Regardless, it is hoped the Model
Treaty will promote discussion, both in a general (or even academic)
sense and within the specific case or cases of regional groups contemplat-
ing the creation of nuclear free zone treaties.
The objective of this article is to contribute to and help foster dia-
logue, and in so doing and simultaneous thereto, expand the framework
and possibilities for these dialogues. If the result is that this analysis and
the Model Treaty provide nuclear free zone negotiators with just the
smallest bit of fodder, then this effort will have been a resounding
success.
What follows is an article-by-article discussion of the Model Treaty's
provisions with an emphasis on the objectives each would attempt to ac-
259. Treaty of Tlatelolco, supra note 5, protocol II, art. 3, at 364; Treaty of Rarotonga,
supra note 3, protocol 2, arts. 1-2, at 1461.
260. Treaty of Rarotonga, supra note 3, protocol 3, at 1463.
261. Working Group Report, supra note 65, at 27.
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complish should the Model Treaty be adopted. The discussion of the sub-
stantive articles of the Model Treaty will compare it to the Treaty of
Rarotonga. The complete Model Treaty is found at the Appendix.
Article 1. Renunciation of Nuclear Explosive Devices.
Article 1 is similar to Article 3262 of the Treaty of Rarotonga. Slightly
more expansive in its breadth, it prohibits the presence and use, in any
form, of nuclear explosive devices by anyone, anywhere within the zone.
Its scope is intended to be all inclusive.
Article 2. Prohibition of Nuclear Transit.
This article incorporates a total ban on the transit of nuclear pow-
ered ships and of any warship or military aircraft containing nuclear ex-
plosive devices anywhere through, over or upon any territory in the zone,
including that territory over which a treaty Party has jurisdiction, includ-
ing its territorial sea and exclusive economic zone. It adopts the language
suggested by the discussion in section III(A) above.
As well as prohibiting such transit, paragraph (c) of the article im-
poses a control system requirement on treaty parties in order to assure
their compliance with these provisions. These requirements are designed
to force foreign state compliance with the control system.
The South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty does not prohibit nu-
clear transit, though it does restrict the presence of nuclear explosive de-
vices and similar items from the zone of application.263 In addition, Arti-
cle 5(2)264 of the Treaty of Rarotonga allows each party to "decide for
itself whether to allow visits by foreign ships and aircraft to its ports and
airfields, [and] . . . territorial sea," so long as it is "in a manner not cov-
ered by the rights of innocent passage ... or transit passage of straits. 2 65
Article 3. Prevention of Dumping of Radioactive Wastes.
Unfortunately, even with the 1983 moratorium2 6 on the dumping of
radioactive wastes at sea (now under review26 7), the question of such
dumping is not academic. Article 3 treats the question of radioactive
waste dumping at sea, and goes far beyond. It prohibits dumping or stor-
age at any location which could contaminate water supplies or soil. It fur-
ther requires that radioactive wastes be stored in monitored, retrievable
and secure waste management facilities on or in land or structures built
thereon or therein. This provision goes well beyond the language of the
262. Treaty of Rarotonga, supra note 3, art. 3, at 1444-45, is entitled "Renunciation of
Nuclear Explosive Devices."
263. Id. arts. 3-6 at 1444-46.
264. Id. art. 5(2) at 1446.
265. Id. (emphasis added).
266. See supra note 253 and accompanying text.
267. Id.
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Treaty of Rarotonga limited solely to dumping.
One of the stickier questions confronting radioactive waste experts
today is what constitutes a sufficiently safe and secure waste management
facility. Some would defer to International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) standards, but these have proven relatively weak. One reason may
be that Article II of the Charter of the IAEA states that a main interest
and responsibility of the IAEA is the promotion of the expansion of the
nuclear industry.2 6 As long as this is one of the primary objectives of the
IAEA, it will continue to incorporate considerations of nuclear expansion
into its recommendations on waste disposal techniques. Thus, IAEA regu-
lations and standards cannot be credible as effective tools for the enforce-
ment of any effective nuclear free zone. Paragraph (d) of the article in
fact calls upon party states to support the development of more responsi-
ble nuclear-safeguard standards on the part of the IAEA.
The Tlatelolco and Rarotonga Treaties require party states to con-
clude nuclear safeguard agreements with the IAEA.269 The Model Nuclear
Free Zone Treaty takes a more restrictive stand, calling on party states to
provide for "maximum" containment, safety and security (which should
be read to include a demonstration that sites selected for radioactive
waste storage will be afforded sufficiently restrictive access to eliminate,
as much as possible, the threat of terrorist attack or sabotage). Admit-
tedly, the standards contained in Article 3 are non-specific. If specific,
effective, workable standards existed, they would be included. As the
state of the art of radioactive waste disposal (not to mention other toxic
waste disposal) does not afford such standards, the best that can be
hoped for at the present time is for party states to police themselves and
one another in the spirit of the treaty in order to effectuate such maxi-
mum protections.
Nothing in this article would prevent any treaty party from availing
itself of the complaint and investigation procedures of Article 12 (Com-
plaints and Special Investigations) if it believed another treaty party to
be employing standards so weak as to be inconsistent with the Treaty.
This device would act as a further assurance of meaningful and maximal
protections and safeguards.
The article avoids any distinction between high and low level wastes.
Both present long-term and highly hazardous dangers. For practical pur-
poses it is felt that all radioactive wastes must be stored in maximally
safe conditions. To allow a lesser standard for low level wastes would tend
to minimize their perceived danger and, perhaps, have the effect of en-
couraging processes and products which generate such wastes.
268. Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Oct. 26, 1956, 8 U.S.T. 1093,
T.I.A.S. 3873.
269. Treaty of Tlatelolco, supra note 5, art. 13, at 340; Treaty of Rarotonga, supra note
3, art. 8(2)(c) at 1448, and annex 2 at 1455.
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Article 4. Peaceful Nuclear Activities.
While acknowledging the necessity of medical and non-military uses
of radioactive substances,7 5 Article 4 disallows the necessity of other
uses, including nuclear power. Its provisions would also prohibit the use
of nuclear isotope irradiation plants as food irradiators. (On the other
hand, hospital irradiators used exclusively for sterilizing food for medical
and sanitation purposes would be permitted)."' Protocol "A" takes a
slightly different approach with regard to the banning of specific uses and
products derived from or utilizing radioactive substances, such as fertiliz-
ers with high concentrations of phosphate, by providing a mechanism for
recognizing socially beneficial uses of some radioactive materials. But un-
less the protocol is adopted, the language of Article 4 will prohibit all
such uses.
This requirement goes far beyond that of the Rarotonga Treaty,
which is limited to support of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and prevents
the provisions of source fissionable materials to non-nuclear states except
under IAEA safeguards.
Article 4 must be read in connection with the definition of radioac-
tive substance found in Article 6.
Article 5. Nuclear Weapons Systems.
This is the last substantive article of the Model Treaty, and is a con-
cept not included in the extant treaties. This article starts off with some
general language proclaiming the parties' seriousness and intent to en-
courage the eventual denuclearization of the entire planet. Except for the
last two paragraphs (h)-(i), the remaining paragraphs (d)-(g) explicitly
address and prohibit indirect ways in which treaty parties might partici-
pate in nuclear weapon development.
Paragraph (h) prohibits the use by any state of electronic surveil-
lance and command facilities (i.e., C3I) if used in connection with the
"performance, operation, targeting, testing, or efficiency of nuclear explo-
sive devices." As discussed in section III(B), this paragraph relies on the
good faith of the parties. As demonstrated in the cited section, seemingly
tougher language would likely result in less compliance with the spirit of
the Model Treaty than this more moderate wording.
Paragraph (i) essentially adopts the FANG Treaty272 principle on
military alliances, which prohibits defense alliances in which nuclear
270. See supra note 238 and accompanying text.
271. Indeed, if it is determined that certain models or types of radioactive or scientific
reactors are particularly prone to abuse of the terms of the treaty, it would not be beyond
the scope of the treaty for the Parties to ban these reactors, either in the body of the treaty
itself or in a protocol or amendment. Such a preclusion might include, for example, the
Norwegian research reactor in Halden. See supra note 106.
272. FANG Treaty, supra note 68, art. l(f). See supra notes 221-28 and accompanying
text.
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weapons would be employed.
Article 6. Definitions and Terms.
"Nuclear explosive device" '73 and "stationing ' 274 are similar to those
definitions in the Treaty of Rarotonga. "Nuclear explosive device" is
designed to be all inclusive, banning all nuclear explosive devices of any
type, anywhere within the zone. Likewise, "stationing" is defined so as to
be equally inclusive of all methods of transporting or basing nuclear ex-
plosive devices. "Territory" is meant to be all inclusive of any land, sea,
subterranean and airspace territory over which a treaty Party has any
legal or juridical claims or right of claim. The nature of the whole treaty
is intended to be all inclusive, so such a definition of territory is good
shorthand if not a pragmatic necessity. "Radioactive substance" is like-
wise intended to be all inclusive. Its breadth includes any and all sub-
stances which are radioactive or contaminated with radioactivity.
Article 7. Zone of Application.
Paragraph (1) refers to Annex 1. Annex 1, which would be tailor-
made for the nation group considering the treaty, would contain the geo-
graphic definition and boundary of the zone covered by any treaty
adopted from this Model Treaty. Paragraph (2), along with Article 20,
would allow the expansion of the treaty zone to include adjacent states
not included in the original treaty boundary, when the conditions therein
specified are met or the broadening of the treaty zone by mutual incorpo-
ration with an adjoining nuclear free zone. (Article 20(2) would ensure
that the new treaty zone would have standards no less than those incor-
porated by the present treaty). This, of course, would further the goals of
global nuclear disarmament or a global or near-global nuclear free zone.
Recall that the two extant nuclear weapon free zones, plus the Antarctic
Treaty, form a single contiguous nuclear free zone comprising two-thirds
of the South Hemisphere as well as some territory in north-of-the-equa-
tor Central America. 275
Articles 8-10. Consultative Committee; Organization; Annual Meeting.
Articles 8-10 establish the organization of the Model Treaty. The
Consultative Committee is the main body of the treaty organization. It
consists of a representative of each treaty party. It makes virtually all
policy, investigative and remedial actions of the treaty organization. An
annual meeting is called for (Article 10), as well as non-scheduled meet-
ings as provided by Article 12.
The Organization (Article 9) is the housekeeping and central clearing
house of the treaty organization. The article calls for a Director and nec-
273. Treaty of Rarotonga, supra note 3, art. 1(c), at 1444.
274. Id. art. 1(d).
275. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
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essary (presumably small) staff. The Organization is responsible for coor-
dination and communication among the treaty Parties.
Article 11. Reports, Exchanges of Information and Freedom of
Information.
The concept of a nuclear free zone, as most international accords,
relies on the good faith of the parties. In order to facilitate the trust re-
quired to ensure the compliance with and reverence for a treaty of this
type, it is believed that maximal information sharing is essential. The
sharing of various reports and information, as called for by the article as
well as "ad hoc" documents, will also provide the confidence needed to
assure that not only are treaty parties adhering to the letter of the law,
but to its spirit as well, particularly in regard to their adherence to moni-
toring requirements of Article 2 (Transit). The article additionally calls
for the disclosure of all reports to the public at large except for those
documents explicitly made confidential under paragraph (5). An auto-
matic "sunset" provision allows for continuance of the confidential status
only on an annually renewable basis.
Article 12. Complaints and Special Investigations.
Another important element of the control system is a means of inves-
tigating alleged violations or breaches of the Model Treaty. Article 12
provides a mechanism to insure that complaints are heard and investiga-
tions carried out without interference and with the promise of the utmost
integrity.
It is felt that these provisions should be part of the main body of the
treaty, not an annex as they are in the Treaty of Rarotonga.2" 6 The South
Pacific Forum exhibited great apparent harmony among its members,2 7 7
probably accounting for the location of these provisions in the treaty's
annex. Though desirable, it is doubtful that few other regions can make
such a claim. Thus, positioning these provisions in the body of the treaty
is appropriate.
Articles 13-14. Corrective Actions; Settlement of Disputes.
Article 13 is an adjunct to Article 12 in that it provides the device for
corrective action to be taken should a complaint made under the provi-
sions of Article 12 prove true. Sanctions of a group of states against an-
other state are difficult to arrive at or enforce. Creativity may help those
in the future to arrive at equitable solutions. Paragraph (3) allows for
such solutions. It also lists as a possible action, which could be used
should the circumstances warrant, economic sanctions. Such sanctions
would likely be most effective where a trade relationship or mechanism is
276. Treaty of Rarotonga, supra note 3, annex 4, at 1456-59.
277. Fyfe & Beeby, supra note 2, at 35-37.
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already in place which would allow concerted effort against the aggrieving
party.
Article 14 provides for arbitration or, in the alternative, the adjudica-
tion of the International Court of Justice, should the aggrieving party fail
to comply with decisions reached under the provisions of Article 13.
Article 15. Amendment.
A two-thirds vote is required for amendments. The Treaty of Raro-
tonga calls for a unanimous vote before an amendment can be adopted2 7 8
Such an approach prevents tyranny of the majority, but so does a two-
thirds vote while still retaining some flexibility.
Article 16. Signature, Ratification and Deposit.
These are standard treaty provisions. Paragraph 1 holds the treaty
open for signature indefinitely. Paragraph 2 requires the treaty be ratified
by the treaty parties. Paragraph 3 specifies the Director of the Organiza-
tion as the Depositary of the Model Treaty once the treaty enters into
force. Until that time, the state archivist of the state in which the treaty
is signed shall serve as the depository.
Articles 17-18. Reservations; Duration and Withdrawal.
Such a treaty as this cannot permit reservations, nor should it termi-
nate after a period of time. It is hoped by the Model Treaty that such an
instrument would not be needed at some time in the future. No one
knows when or if that time will come. The permanency of this agreement
demonstrates the commitment and determination of the treaty parties to
a nuclear free world. To say that after so many years we will reconsider
our decision to refrain from building or using nuclear weapons does little
to build confidence in one's treaty partners.
Permitting reservations, or a provision allowing states to be free from
formally being bound until all possible treaty parties have ratified the
treaty as is the case with the Treaty of Tlatelolco, 27 9 leads to inconsistent
results and the denigration of the treaty's credibility. Indeed, both Brazil
and Argentina 280 are believed to have been undertaking substantial re-
search and development in nuclear energy and nuclear explosions. How-
ever, the two Latin American states have been engaged in a confidence
building dialogue to open each other's nuclear facilities to one another.
28 1
278. Treaty of Rarotonga, supra note 3, art. 11, at 1449.
279. Article 28(2) of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, supra note 5, at 354, provides that the
treaty does not enter into force until all states eligible have ratified the treaty or its proto-
cols. It also allows states to waive this requirement. Id. art. 28(2). Chile and Brazil are the
only Latin American states to have not exercised this waiver. Martinez Cobo, The Tlatelolco
Treaty: An Update, 26 INT'L ATOM. ENERGY AGENCY BULL. 25, 26 (Sept. 1984).
280. L. Spector, supra note 16, at 179-214.
281. Id. at 183-186.
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Article 19. Entry Into Force.
The Treaty of Tlatelolco enters into force when all states within the
region ratify the treaty.2 2 This may never happen. In eighteen years Ar-
gentina has not ratified the treaty, Cuba and Guyana have not signed
it,2" 3 and France has not ratified Protocol I. In order to facilitate entry
into force, the Model Treaty requires ratification by only two-thirds of
the signatories.
Article 20. Extension of the Nuclear Free Zone.
Article 20 contains unique provisions designed to accommodate the
growth of nuclear free zones. At some future point it may be more appro-
priate for individual states to join with neighboring nuclear free zones.
For example, a hypothetical, future independent New Caledonia (by
whatever name it may be known if and when it obtains independence
from France), which lies within the region encompassed by the SPNFZ,
might want to join that treaty. The Treaty of Rarotonga allows for this
possibility if that non-treaty state is a member of the South Pacific Fo-
rum.2"4 Perhaps not even this kind of condition should be required of a
state which seeks to join a nuclear free zone.
Similarly, it is conceivable that neighboring nuclear free zones would
find it desirable to "join forces," as it were. Article 20(2) allows for that
possibility while insuring the standards of the treaty are not diminished
by such a union. For example, a single, truly nuclear free entity compris-
ing the South Pacific and Latin America zones, spanning two-thirds of
the Southern Hemisphere's oceans, would be an extraordinary political
presence. Article 20 works in conjunction with Article 7.
Article 21. Authentic Text.
Here would be stated the language(s) of the authentic or official texts
of the treaty.
282. Treaty of Tlatelolco, supra note 5, art. 28, at 352, 356.
283. A territorial dispute between Venezuela, the United Kingdom and Guyana, cou-
pled with Article 25(2) of the Treaty of Tlatelolco which prohibits a political entity from
admission to treaty when its territory is subject to dispute involving and "extra-continental"
entity, prevents Guyana's participation.
284. Treaty of Rarotonga, supra note 3, art. 12(3):
If a member of the South Pacific Forum whose territory is outside the South
Pacific Nuclear Free Zone becomes a Party to this Treaty, Annex 1 [describing
the area encompassing the treaty] shall be deemed to be amended so far as
required to enclose at least the territory of that Party within the boundaries of
the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone. The delineation of any area added pursu-
ant to this paragraph shall be approved by the South Pacific Forum.
Id. at 1450.
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Annex 1.
Here would be the geographical definition of the zone of application
of the treaty.
Protocol A.
This protocol is a little unusual. First of all, unlike the numbered
protocols which follow and those of the Tlatelolco and Rarotonga Trea-
ties, it applies to states party to the main treaty. Second, it modifies a
provision of the treaty: unless the protocol has entered into force, the
more restrictive language of Article 4 will be in full force.
The hardened nuclear opponent would oppose any non-medical and
non-scientific use of radioactive substances. But there are scores of prod-
ucts utilizing radioactive substances and the list is growing monthly.
Some of those products may be of great value. A blanket prohibition is
thus too restrictive for many. Protocol A provides for a case-by-case re-
view, replacing the virtual prohibition of Article 4 if it stood by itself. The
Protocol will require the parties to vote on every product to be permitted
(or prohibited). (This in no way would prohibit an individual state from
imposing stricter domestic rules.) Every non-approved item would thus
be considered specifically excluded.
Protocols 1-3.
These protocols are essentially identical to those of the Treaty of Ra-
rotonga with two exceptions. Whereas Protocol 2 of the extant treaties
does not apply to all of the treaty's prohibitions and obligations (which
could be applicable) to the Protocol, the Model Treaty does. If a nuclear
power is asked to give its assurance of respect for the Treaty, it should be
asked to do so for all treaty obligations. Otherwise there would be "loop-
holes" which would render the treaty less effective and the protocols less
meaningful.
The Treaty of Rarotonga permits a protocol-ratifying party to with-
draw from the protocol "if it decides that extraordinary events, related to
the subject matter of [the] protocol, have jeopardised [sic] its supreme
interests."2 ' This language allows the nuclear powers a sizable loophole
by giving them the ability to opt-out of protocol compliance virtually at
will. It was included in the Rarotonga protocols in order to insure their
ratification by the United States and the other Western nuclear powers.
They refused to sign the protocols anyway.2 6 If the intent of a nuclear
free zone treaty is to maintain the nuclear freedom of the region, a nu-
clear power which ratifies the protocol should not be given the assurance
that it can back out of compliance on the mere declaration that its "su-
preme interests" are jeopardized. The Model Treaty eliminates this loop-
285. Treaty of Rarotonga, supra note 3, protocol 1, art. 5, passim.
286. See infra notes 69-79 and accompanying text.
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hole in each extra-zonal state protocol by simply stating that the "...
Protocol is permanent in nature and shall remain in force indefinitely."
Protocols -5 would apply to all nuclear powers. While the Model
Treaty specifies that the protocols are open to France, China, the Soviet
Union, Great Britain and the United States, there is no reason they could
include the near-nuclear and "unofficial" nuclear powers. Like the Raro-
tonga and Tlatelolco protocols, the Model Treaty calls for entry into force
of the protocols for each nuclear power upon deposit of their instrument
of ratification2
87
The protocols do not require protocol parties to automatically accede
to Amendments to the Model Treaty.
Protocols 4-5.
The Model Treaty contains the two additional protocols discussed in
Section I(E). Being that the law of the sea-related proposals of Section
III(A) most likely will be among the most difficult to enforce, it makes
sense to attempt to secure nuclear power agreement to honor those provi-
sions. Protocol 4 would accomplish this objective. To avoid perceived su-
perpower imbalance and to facilitate their accession to the protocol it
would not come into force for any nuclear power until all have deposited
their instruments of ratification, unlike the other protocols which come
into force for each state upon deposit of their instrument of ratification.
The last protocol, Protocol 5, seeks another nuclear power assurance:
that they will not test nuclear capable delivery vehicles anywhere through
or within the zone.
V. CONCLUSION
The Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America
and the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty are courageous and pow-
erful statements. Not only do they warrant to prohibit nuclear weapons
(and more, in the case of the South Pacific treaty) from the regions in
question, but they also sent - and continue to send - a message to the
nuclear-weapon-states that their nuclear weapons policies are a threat to
the security and existence of the treaty parties, as well as of the whole
world.
Our planet is far from being nuclear-free. Even in this post-Cold War
era, many feel that it is doubtful that Earth will ever see such a day
again. But it is also certain that greater steps can be taken to reduce the
dangers of nuclear war and radioactive poisoning from befalling those
states so desiring. Many countries around the world have expressed this
desire, including the parties to the Tlatelolco and Rarotonga Treaties.
The realities of international politics, of course, have prevented more
287. See, e.g., Treaty of Tlatelolco, supra note 5, protocol I, art. 3, at 362; Treaty of
Rarotonga, supra note 3, protocol 1, art. 5, at 1460.
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nations from forming nuclear-free zones, as well as unilaterally declaring
themselves to be nuclear free. The history of debate in the United Na-
tions attests to this. 88 Still, two such treaties are in force.
The debate over nuclear free zones is growing constantly stronger.289
The ASEAN states are already considering the formation of a nuclear
free zone. 29" Future nuclear free zones will surely provide greater protec-
tions than the Treaty of Rarotonga, just as that treaty provided signifi-
cant protections not found in the Treaty of Tlatelolco. The new provi-
sions that these new treaties will include are impossible to predict. But
leaders in this movement have an obligation to propel the debate forward
by analyzing the existing treaties in order to identify their strengths as
well as areas where improved security can be had. That role involves sug-
gesting goals which national leaders may aim for, including discussion to
shape future treaties. It also requires helping to provide arguments for
propelling these proposals forward. That is the province of this essay and
the Model Treaty.
The Model Treaty was written with the objective of producing a
workable framework, both for the principals in future negotiations, as
well as other, more "distant" contributors to the discussion. That the pro-
posals may seem extreme to some is, in part, due to idealism. It also dem-
onstrates how far a group of states have to go to achieve comprehensive
nuclear freedom.
The purpose here is not to suggest that such a result can be easily
achieved. Or that the process will be relatively pain-free. Or that the end
product will be readily accepted by the world political order. The con-
trary is the far more likely result, at least initially. We already know that
some world powers have not smiled favorably upon the relatively mild
Treaty of Rarotonga.29 ' There will be fallout with regard to the Law of
the Sea (UNCLOS III, IV, V or whatever). And some geographically dis-
tant allies may feel compelled to reconsider the status of alliances.
Whether consideration of or entry into a nuclear free zone treaty is
the right course for a given state is beyond the scope of this article. For
the state that does venture down that path, this article has attempted to
make clear that, despite these concerns, such a course is fully justified
and wholly defensible. In the context of international law, adopting and
adhering to a nuclear free zone treaty, such as the Model Treaty herein, is
legally supportable.
288. See infra notes 7-13 and accompanying text.
289. See, e.g., infra notes 69-84, 99 and accompanying text.
290. See supra note 6.
291. See infra notes 69-82 and accompanying text.
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APPENDIX
MODEL NUCLEAR FREE ZONE TREATY
PREAMBLE
In the name of their peoples and faithfully interpreting their desires
and aspirations, the Governments of the States which sign this Model
Nuclear Free Zone Treaty,
Recalling Article VII of the Non-Proliferation Treaty which holds
that it is the "right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in
order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective
territories,"
Recalling that the United Nations General Assembly, in its Resolu-
tion 808(ix), adopted unanimously, as one of the three points of a co-
ordinated program of disarmament; "the total prohibition of the use and
manufacture of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction of
every type,"
Recalling that the United Nations First Special Session of the Gen-
eral Assembly on Disarmament, in its unanimously-adopted Final Docu-
ment, declared that "the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free-zones on
the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region
concerned constitutes an important disarmament measure," that "the
process of establishing such zones in different parts of the world should
be encouraged with the ultimate objective of achieving a world entirely
free of nuclear weapons," that "the States participating in such zones
should undertake to comply fully with all the objectives, purposes and
principles of the agreements or arrangements establishing the zones, thus
ensuring that they are genuinely free from nuclear weapons," and that
"with respect to such zones, the nuclear-weapon States in turn are called
upon to give undertakings, the modalities of which are to be negotiated
with the competent authority of each zone, in particular: (a) to strictly
respect the status of the nuclear-weapon-free-zone; (b) to refrain from the
use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against the States of the zone,"
Recalling the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in
Latin America, the first regional treaty creating a zone free from the dan-
gers of nuclear weapons,
Recalling the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, declaring that
region to be free of all nuclear explosive devices and radioactive waste
dumping, and
Convinced that the mere existence of nuclear weapons is a threat to
life and civilization as we know it and that the presence of such weapons
on, in or near any sovereign territory, places that territory under direct
risk of suffering a nuclear attack,
Convinced that the existence of any nuclear explosive device, or ships
or aircraft carrying any nuclear explosive device, or support facilities for
such weapons, ships or aircraft, within the territory, territorial sea or
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ocean straits of any State, makes that State, and the region, a potential
target for nuclear attack, and thus such devices, ships and aircraft are
prejudicial to the peace, good order and security, and a threat to the sov-
ereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of that state,
Convinced that any aircraft or ship containing any radioactive sub-
stance is fully capable of inadvertently leaking or otherwise discharging
that material through some accident, design flaw, human carelessness or
attack, and is thus an unnecessary and potentially life-threatening danger
to all life through which it passes and transits, and is thus an unconscion-
able and an unacceptable risk to the protection and preservation of the
marine environment,
Convinced that any aircraft or ship containing any radioactive sub-
stance is not immune from intentionally discharging that material,
whether arising from an emergency situation or otherwise,
Convinced that there is no justifiable purpose for any kind of nuclear
explosive device, that there is no acceptable basis for the continued test-
ing of nuclear explosive devices and that they are a source of needless
radioactive contamination,
Convinced that radioactive substances are extremely hazardous and
pose a substantial danger to all life, that there is a grave, substantial risk
of contamination associated with the storage of such materials and in par-
ticular radioactive wastes, and that the risks of exposure to such dangers
must be minimized to the greatest extent practicable,
Convinced that nuclear power is an uneconomical and potentially
dangerous source of electricity which rarely, if ever, provides benefits
which are outweighed by the costs, risks and hardships nuclear power fa-
cilities create,
Convinced that a nuclear free zone is an appropriate and desirable
way for non-nuclear States to prevent the deployment of nuclear weapons
as well as protect their inhabitants from the scourge of nuclear weapons
and nuclear pollution,
Convinced, as were the signers to the first Nuclear Free Zone Treaty
in Tlatelolco that the proliferation of nuclear weapons is inevitable unless
States, in the exercise of their sovereign rights, impose restrictions, on
themselves in order to prevent it,
Finally,
Determined to support the creation of nuclear free zones wherever in
the world States come together to protect their interests and insure their
survival and vitality,
Determined that it is in the interests of the people of this world, and
of all mankind, that this region shall forever be free from armed conflict,
and
Determined, in light of the risks detailed above, that the establish-
ment of a nuclear free zone is the best way to reduce the risks associated
with nuclear weapons, nuclear pollution and nuclear contamination, as
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well as provide for the secure and healthy future of this people of this
region,
Have agreed as follows:
ARTICLE 1
RENUNCIATION OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DEVICES
Each Party undertakes:
(a) not to manufacture, acquire, possess, test, use, or have any con-
trol whatsoever over any nuclear explosive device, directly or indirectly,
anywhere in the world;
(b) not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture, acquisi-
tion, possession, testing, or use of any nuclear explosive device;
(c) to prevent the testing of any nuclear explosive device anywhere in
its territory, territorial sea or Exclusive Economic Zone;
(d) not to encourage, authorize, or otherwise assist, directly or indi-
rectly, in any way, in the manufacture, acquisition, possession, testing,
use or control of any nuclear explosive device whatsoever by any State,
whether or not a Party to this Treaty; and
(e) to prohibit and prevent the storage, use, installation, deployment,
stationing or possession of any nuclear explosive device anywhere within
their territory, as defined in Article 6, paragraph 3 of this Treaty, inside
or outside the Nuclear Free Zone, by any State, whether or not a Party to
this Treaty or its Protocols.
ARTICLE 2
PROHIBITION OF NUCLEAR TRANSIT
Each Party undertakes:
(a) to accept and abide by the principle here stated that the transit
or passage through any waters or airspace of any ship or aircraft whose
propulsion is wholly or partly dependent on nuclear power:
(i) is prejudicial to the peace, good order and security of the coastal
State;
(ii) by virtue of its presence, is a threat against the sovereignty, terri-
torial integrity and political independence of a coastal state or a State
bordering a strait; and
(iii) is a direct and immediate threat to, and cannot comport and
accord with, protection and preservation of the marine environment.
(b) to prevent and prohibit visits by foreign warships and military
aircraft to its ports and airfields, transit of its airspace by foreign aircraft,
and navigation by foreign warships in its territorial sea, archipelagic wa-
ters, straits and other seas claimed by it, inside or outside the Nuclear
Free Zone, when such ships or aircraft carry nuclear explosive devices of
any kind, whether activated or not;
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(c) to require that, prior to granting transit or visitation privileges to
its ports, airfields, airspace or sea territory, to a foreign warship or mili-
tary aircraft, the foreign State of whose forces such warship or aircraft are
a part must request permission to transit or visit the Party's ports, air-
fields, airspace or sea territory with adequate advance notice of such
transit or visitation as to assure orderly processing of the request:
(i) failure to provide adequate notice to allowing orderly processing
of such a request shall result in automatic denial of the transit or visita-
tion rights requested;
(ii) each Party to this treaty shall develop a procedure for processing
such requests, and that procedure shall be communicated to all other
Parties to this Treaty, to the Secretary General of the United Nations,
and to the Governments of all nations known to have nuclear capabilities;
and
(iii) all such foreign warships and military aircraft transitting or vis-
iting a Party's claimed seas, ports and airfield shall be open to inspection
for the purposes of verifying the non-presence of nuclear explosive de-
vices upon request of the Party or any other Party to this Treaty when
any such party has reason to believe such foreign warship or military air-
craft is in violation of this Treaty.
ARTICLE 3
PREVENTION OF DUMPING AND USE OF RADIOACTIVE SUB-
STANCES AND FISSION PRODUCTS
Each Party undertakes:
(a) to prevent the storage, dumping or disposal of any radioactive
wastes and any other radioactive substances by anyone in its sea terri-
tory, or on or in any other body of water, any alluvial lands, any riparian
lands, any lands adjacent to a watershed or subterranean stream, river or
lake, any lands possibly subject to flooding, or any land where, if exposed,
radioactive substances could leach into the surrounding or nearby soil,
strata or water;
(b) to prevent the storage or disposal of radioactive waste materials
except in monitored retrievable and secure radioactive waste management
facilities on or in the land or in structures built thereon or therein, and
when stored in a manner which can be shown to the satisfaction of com-
petent national bodies of all states party to afford the maximum in:
(i) containment of radioactive materials from the environment;
(ii) safety of workers and the public;
(iii) security from terrorism and theft;
(iv) accessibility to permit expert inspection and supervision;
(v) monitoribility to ensure the early detection of any failure to meet
the above criteria; and
(vi) retrievability in the event of the detection of any such failure.
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The onus of proof in demonstrating that these criteria be fulfilled for
the duration of the design life of the facility shall lie with the prospective
operators of the proposed facility.
(c) not to take any action to assist, encourage or support the dump-
ing or disposal by anyone of radioactive wastes and any other radioactive
substances, except as expressly permitted by this Treaty, anywhere
within the Nuclear Free Zone or in any other place;
(d) to call upon the United Nations and the International Atomic
Energy Agency to abandon, as one of its purposes, the promotion of the
expansion of the nuclear industry and the development of standards af-




1.(a) The Parties undertake to prohibit the planning, construction
and use of all nuclear reactors, whether on land or in ships, other than
nuclear reactors required for medical or non-military scientific purposes,
except those already in full service and used for the generation of electri-
cal power at the date of the conclusion of this Treaty.
(b) Reactors required for medical or non-military scientific purposes,
as permitted in Paragraph (a) of this Article 4, shall not be utilized for
any other purpose.
(c) Each Party shall shut down and begin dismantling all other nu-
clear reactors within one year of that Party's ratification of this Treaty.
Constructed but not yet fully operational nuclear reactors, other than
those medical and non-scientific reactors permitted in Paragraph (a) of
this Article 4, will not be placed into operation.
2. Except as provided in paragraph 1 of this Article and Protocol A of
this Treaty, the Parties agree that there shall be no use of nuclear or





(a) to support and encourage the complete nuclear disarmament of
this planet;
(b) to support the continued and enhanced effectiveness of the inter-
national non-proliferation and anti-nuclearization systems based on the
Non-Proliferation Treaty, and the several Nuclear-Free and Nuclear-
Weapon-Free-Zone Treaties;
(c) to support and encourage the formation of other nuclear free zone
treaties, particular those proposed for regions contiguous to the Nuclear
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Free Zone created and encompassed by this Treaty;
(d) to prevent the testing of any delivery vehicle or other device
designed or intended to carry or deploy nuclear explosive devices through
or over its territory;
(e) to discourage the testing of any delivery vehicle or device
designed or intended to carry, guide or deploy nuclear explosive devices
through or over any territory or seas anywhere within the Nuclear Free
Zone;
(f) to prevent and prohibit the development, manufacture or produc-
tion of any delivery vehicle or other device, in whole or in any part
thereof, designed or intended to carry, guide or deploy nuclear explosive
devices, by anyone within its territory;
(g) not to participate in any way in the testing, use, design, manufac-
ture, production, possession or control of any nuclear explosive device by
anyone or any State, directly or indirectly;
(h) to prohibit the use by any State of facilities carrying out com-
mand, control, communication, intelligence, surveillance, navigation, re-
search or other functions, located anywhere on its territory, when em-
ployed for aiding the performance, operation, targeting, testing, or
efficiency of nuclear explosive devices; and
(i) not to participate or enter into any military or defense alliance
under which nuclear weapons would be used in defense of or with the
cooperation of any Party.
ARTICLE 6
DEFINITIONS AND TERMS
For purposes of this Treaty:
1. "Nuclear explosive device" means any nuclear weapon or other de-
vice capable of releasing nuclear energy, irrespective of the purpose for
which it could be or is intended to be used, and includes any such device
in any stage of assembly or disassembly.
2. "Nuclear Free Zone" means zone of application of this treaty as
defined in Annex 1 and Articles 7 and 20 of this Treaty.
3. "Territory" means the land territory, bodies of water thereon, ter-
ritorial sea, exclusive economic zone, and any other land or sea territory
claimed by a Party to this Treaty, as well as the airspace and subterra-
nean and sub-ocean surface area demarcated by that territory. "Sea terri-
tory" means any part of a Party's territory other than land.
4. "Stationing" means emplacement, home porting, deployment,
stockpiling, transportation on land, in the air or at sea, emplantation,
storage, installation or other physical presence.
5. "Radioactive substance" means any fissionable material, fission
products, fission by-products, spent radioactive or nuclear material, the
waste products from any fission reaction or any radioactive substances,
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raw and source materials which can be processed into such substances,
items contaminated by such substances, and materials or products whose
value is due either wholly or in part to their radioactivity or their inclu-
sion of radioactive material.
6. "Nuclear reactor" is any device or structure capable of containing
a controlled nuclear fission chain reaction.
7. "Party" means any State which has deposited its instrument of
ratification to this Treaty with the Depository of this Treaty. "Associate
Party" means any State which has deposited its instrument of ratification
to any of the Protocols to this Treaty with the Depository.
ARTICLE 7
ZONE OF APPLICATION
1. This Treaty and its protocols shall apply to the whole of the terri-
tory within the Nuclear Free Zone as defined in Annex 1.
2. The zone of application of this Treaty may be extended to other
contiguous areas by amendment of this Treaty, including but not limited
to:
(a) Parties outside the Nuclear Free Zone as defined in Annex 1
which accede to this Treaty after its conclusion and signing, as provided
in Article 20(1); and
(b) the consolidation of adjoining nuclear free zone and nuclear
weapon free zone treaties with this Treaty, as provided in Article 20(2).
ARTICLE 8
CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE
1. There is hereby established a Consultative Committee. The Con-
sultative Committee shall be composed of one representative of each of
the Parties. The Consultative Committee shall be chaired by the repre-
sentative to the Consultative Committee of the Party which last hosted
the annual meeting of the Consultative Committee as prescribed in Arti-
cle 10 of this Treaty. Each representative to the Consultative Committee,
at the Committee's annual meeting and other meetings as may be called,
may be accompanied by advisors.
2. A quorum shall be constituted by representatives of one half the
Parties. Except as otherwise provided by this Treaty, decisions of the
Consultative Committee shall be taken by consensus or, if failing consen-
sus, by a two-thirds majority vote of those present and voting. The Con-
sultative Committee shall adopt such other rules of procedure as it sees
fit.
3. All meetings of the Consultative Committee shall be open to each
Party to the Treaty.
4. Without prejudice to the conduct of consultations among Parties
by other means, at the written request of one-third of the Parties to this
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Treaty requesting a meeting of the Consultative Committee for the same
purpose, the Director of the Organization shall convene a meeting of the
Consultative Committee as soon as possible.
ARTICLE 9
ORGANIZATION
1. The Parties hereby establish an organization to oversee and facil-
itate compliance with this Treaty. The organization shall be known as the
Nuclear Free Zone Organization, hereinafter referred to as the
"Organization."
2. The Organization shall consist of a Director and necessary staff to
conduct its affairs. The Director shall be elected for a term of five years
by a vote of the Consultative Committee.
3. The Organization shall maintain offices at the city where this
Treaty was signed.
4. The Organization shall be responsible for:
(a) scheduling and holding annual meetings as provided under Arti-
cle 10;
(b) coordinating consultations among Parties and investigations as
provided for under Article 11;
(c) disseminating all communications, including reports and ex-
changes of information, between Parties, as provided under Articles 12
and 13, as well as to other international organizations and the world pub-
lic at large, as provided elsewhere in this treaty.
ARTICLE 10
ANNUAL MEETING
1. An annual meeting of the Consultative Committee shall be held for
the purpose of reviewing operations of the past and upcoming year, in-
cluding budgeting and activities of the Director and of the Organization.
The annual meeting shall be chaired by the representative to the Organi-
zation of each Party in rotation in successive years. The meeting shall
take place at a location within the territory of, and at the choosing of,
that Party.
2. The Director shall report to the annual meeting on the status of
this Treaty and all matters arising under or in relation to it, including all
matters and communications made under Articles 11 through 15.
ARTICLE 11
REPORTS, EXCHANGES OF INFORMATION, AND FREEDOM OF
INFORMATION
1. Each Party and Associate Party shall submit to the Director an-
nual reports stating that no activity prohibited under this Treaty or the
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Protocols it has signed has occurred in their respective territories (in the
case of Associate Parties, with respect to territory with the Nuclear Free
Zone). The Director shall circulate such reports to all Parties and Associ-
ate Parties.
2. Each Party and Associate Party shall report to the Director as
soon as possible, and prior to, an event occurring within its jurisdiction
which may affect the implementation or efficacy of this Treaty. The Di-
rector shall circulate such reports to all Parties and Associate Parties as
quickly as possible.
3. The Parties shall undertake to keep each other informed on mat-
ters arising under or in relation to this Treaty. They may exchange infor-
mation by communicating it to the Director, who shall circulate it to all
Parties.
4. The Parties shall report to the Director all suspected incidents of
violations of the Nuclear Free Zone by ships and aircraft powered by or
containing nuclear reactors, or which are capable of carrying nuclear ex-
plosive devices of any kind which have not provided unequivocal declara-
tions that the they do not carry nuclear explosive devices, as provided in
Article 2.
5. All reports prepared by the Director, the Consultative Committee,
Parties, Associate Parties, other non-Parties, the IAEA, and by Special
Investigation Teams, relating to any matter arising under or in relation to
this Treaty or violations of its provisions, shall be made freely and
promptly available to any citizen of any Party, as well as to the United
Nations Secretary-General. The only exceptions shall be individual re-
ports which the Consultative Committee votes explicitly not to make
public. The Consultative Committee may vote on an annual basis to keep
a given report from the public. Otherwise, such reports shall be made
public after one year from the date of the last vote not to make the report
public.
ARTICLE 12
COMPLAINTS AND SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS
1. The Consultative Committee shall have the power to carry out spe-
cial investigations anywhere within the Nuclear Free Zone when re-
quested by any Party which reasonably suspects that:
(a) another Party has taken action or is about to take action inconsis-
tent with this Treaty,
(b) an Associate Party has taken or is about to take action inconsis-
tent with the Protocols to this Treaty to which it is a party, or
(c) a non-Party is engaging in some activity inconsistent with this
Treaty while within the Nuclear Free Zone.
2. Any such complaint shall first be brought to the attention of the
Director who shall then convene a meeting of the Consultative Committee
as soon as practicable. Upon consideration of the claim and having al-
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lowed the Party (or Associate Party) charged with a breach or potential
brach of its obligation an opportunity to respond to the claim, the Con-
sultative Committee may decide, by consensus or simple majority vote of
all Parties present excluding the complained of Party, to commence an
investigation of the claim. The Consultative Committee shall determine
the scope of the investigation.
3. Such investigation shall commence forthwith and shall be con-
ducted by a special investigation team of three to five suitably qualified
special investigators appointed by the Consultative Committee in consul-
tation with the complained of (if a Party to this treaty) and complaining
Parties and the Director, provided that no national of either Party shall
serve on the special investigation team. If so requested by the complained
of Party, the investigation team may be accompanied by representatives
of that Party. Neither the right of consultation on the appointment of
special investigators, nor the right to accompany special investigators,
shall delay or impede the expedient work of the special investigation
team.
4. Each Party shall give to all special investigators full and free ac-
cess to all places, persons, and information which it may deem relevant or
necessary to enable it to conduct its investigation. Special investigators
shall be the sole determiners of which places, persons, and information
are relevant or necessary to their investigation, as well as all reasonable
and humane methods, respectful of basic human rights to be employed in
conducting their investigation.
5. The Party complained of shall take appropriate steps to facilitate
the special investigation, and shall grant to special investigators, privi-
leges and immunities necessary for the performance of their functions,
including inviolability for all papers and documents, and immunity from
arrest, detention and legal process for words spoken and written, and
places visited, in connection with the special investigation.
6. The special investigation team shall report in writing as quickly as
possible to the Consultative Committee, outlining its activities, setting
out relevant facts and information, with supporting evidence and docu-
mentation as appropriate, and stating their conclusions and recommenda-
tions. The report shall be communicated to all Parties and Associate Par-
ties to this Treaty, and to the Secretary-General of the United Nations,
as provided under Article 11.
7. If a complainant declares to the Director that the complaint con-
stitutes an emergency and provides sufficient grounds for that belief, the
Director may appoint and dispatch a special investigation team, as other-
wise provided in paragraph 3 above, within 24 hours of receipt of the
complaint. A meeting of the Consultative Committee will be called and
convened as soon as possible, at which time the Consultative Committee
may review the scope of the special investigation team appointed by the
Director and provide further delineation of the scope of the investigation.
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ARTICLE 13
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
1. Upon presentation of the investigation team's report, the Consult-
ative Committee shall take whatever reasonable corrective action it
deems necessary to bring the situation, if inconsistent with this Treaty,
into compliance with the Treaty, or to prevent an action which would be
inconsistent with this Treaty. The Consultative Committee may also take
whatever reasonable action it deems necessary in order to insure peace,
security and protection of the environment. If the complained of State is
a non-Party or Associate Party to this Treaty, its compliance to the above
procedures shall be sought.
2. If a Party determined to have acted in a way inconsistent with this
Treaty by the Consultative Committee fails to adhere to the Consultative
Committee's corrective actions or other recommendations regarding that
violation, the Dispute Settlement Procedures, as provided for in Article
13, shall be called into force unless otherwise determined.
3. If any non-Party or Associate Party fails to comply with the Con-
sultative Committee's corrective actions as provided for under Paragraph
1 of this Article, or if any Party to this Treaty fails to comply with any
directives or correction actions provided for under Paragraph 2 of this
Article, then all Parties to this Treaty will undertake to compel such com-
pliance by such peaceful means as may be deemed necessary and appro-
priate, including but not limited to suspension of all economic privileges
granted that State and products of national origin of that State, until
that party complies with the above procedures, the complaint is found to
be without grounds, or remedial or disciplinary action recommended by
the Consultative Committee has been effectively carried out. Nothing in
this paragraph shall be construed so as to directly violate provisions of
any valid and binding multilateral treaty, the sole or primary subject of
which is international trade.
ARTICLE 14
SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES
1. In the case of a Party to this Treaty determined to have acted in a
way inconsistent with this Treaty by the Consultative Committee which
fails to adhere to the Consultative Committee's corrective actions or other
recommendations regarding that violation, the Parties involved shall un-
dertake to submit the decision to arbitration. An arbitration panel shall
be selected as follows: The aggrieving Party and the Consultative Com-
mittee shall each appoint an arbitrator of their choosing, who shall then
select a third arbitrator to complete the panel, which shall arbitrate the
dispute.
2. If in the above situation an agreeable arbitration panel cannot be
found and unless the Parties concerned agree on another mode of peace-
ful settlement, the Parties and the Consultative Committee shall submit
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the matter to the adjudication of the International Court of Justice.
ARTICLE 15
AMENDMENT
The Consultative Committee shall consider proposals for amendment to
this Treaty proposed by any Party as communicated to the Director. The
Director shall circulate the proposed amendment to all Parties not less
than three months prior to the convening of the Consultative Committee
for this purpose. Any proposal agreed upon by a two-thirds vote of the
present members of the Consultative Committee shall be communicated
to the Director, who shall circulate it for acceptance to all Parties.
Amendments adopted shall enter into force thirty days after receipt by
the Depositary of acceptances from two-thirds of the Parties.
ARTICLE 16
SIGNATURE, RATIFICATION AND DEPOSIT
1. This Treaty shall be open indefinitely for signature by all States
situated within the area defined by Annex 1 and Articles 7 and 20.
2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States.
3. The state archivist of the state in which this treaty is concluded
and signed is hereby designated Depositary of this Treaty and its Proto-
cols, and respective Instruments of Ratification until such time as the
Treaty is entered into force as provided in Article 19 and the first Direc-
tor of the Organization is appointed, at which time the Director will
thereby be designated Depositary of this Treaty and its Protocols, and
respective Instruments of Ratification.
4. The Depositary shall transmit certified copies of this Treaty and
its Protocols to the Governments of all signatory States and all States
eligible to become Parties to the Protocols to the Treaty, and shall notify
them of signatures and ratifications of the Treaty and its Protocols.
ARTICLE 17
RESERVATIONS
This Treaty shall not be subject to reservations.
ARTICLE 18
DURATION AND WITHDRAWAL




1. This Treaty shall enter into force on the date of deposit of the
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instrument of ratification amounting to two-thirds of the signatories to
the Treaty.
2. For a signatory which ratifies this Treaty after the date this Treaty
comes into force, the Treaty shall enter into force on the date of deposit
of its instrument of ratification.
ARTICLE 20
EXTENSION OF THE NUCLEAR FREE ZONE
1. If a state whose territory is contiguous with the zone of application
of this Treaty seeks to become a Party to this Treaty, that state shall
make written application to the Director. The Director shall circulate the
application to all Parties not less than three months prior to the conven-
ing of the Consultative Committee for this purpose. Upon a decision of
the Consultative Committee to accept the application, that State shall be
invited to become a Party to and sign the Treaty. Upon deposit of its
instrument of ratification, the state shall become a Party to the Treaty as
provided in Article 19(2).
2. Upon the two-thirds vote of the Consultative Committee and a
similar vote by the appropriate decision-making body of a contiguous nu-
clear free zone or nuclear weapon free zone treaty organization, a broader
nuclear free zone shall be declared by the Parties to those Treaties. The
Consultative Committee will undertake consideration of such, if and only
if the result of a positive vote and the joint effort:
(a) would serve the purposes of both treaties;
(b) that the rights and obligations prescribed by this Treaty will not
in any way be diluted or their effectiveness in any way compromised, and
that they, at minimum will apply to all Parties of both treaties anyplace
within the zone of application of this Treaty or the other treaty;
(c) that the broader nuclear free zone will not obviate this Treaty;
and
(d) that the Parties and organs of both treaties will work together to
enforce the strongest nuclear prohibitory provisions of both treaties
within the broader nuclear free zone.
ARTICLE 21
AUTHENTIC TEXT
This Treaty, of which the [insert appropriate languages] texts are equally
authentic, shall be registered by the Depositary in accordance with Arti-
cle 102 of the United Nations Charter. The Depositary shall notify the
Secretary-General of the United Nations of the signatures, ratifications
and amendments relating to this Treaty.
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ANNEX 1
NUCLEAR FREE ZONE
The Nuclear Free Zone contains all of the land and water territories with
the area bounded by a line -
[insert geographic bounds of zone of application].
ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS TO THE MODEL NUCLEAR FREE
ZONE TREATY
PROTOCOL A
The Parties to this Protocol,
Being Parties to the Model Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (the Treaty),
Have Agreed as follows:
Article 1
Each Party undertakes to prohibit the entry, development, manufacture,
use, storage, sale and distribution within the Territory of each Party as
that term is defined in Article 6 of the Treaty except those radioactive
substances or items containing or made of, in whole or in part, of any
radioactive substance,
(a) required for medical and non-military and scientific purposes;
and
(b) other items of great value to society for which there are no suita-
ble non-radioactive substitutes as determined by Article 4.
Article 2
The Consultative Committee shall be the sole organ capable of determin-
ing which items are of great value to society and for which there are no
suitable non-radioactive substitutes. Such determination shall be made
by a two-thirds majority vote of the Consultative Committee.
Article 3
This Protocol shall be open for signature to all signatories to the Treaty.
Article 4
This Protocol shall be subject to ratification.
Article 5
This Protocol shall remain in force until it is denounced by one-half of
the signatories to this Protocol.
Article 6
This Protocol shall enter into force on the date of deposit of the instru-
ment of ratification amounting to two-thirds of the signatories of the
Treaty. For a signatory which ratifies this Protocol after the date this
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Treaty comes into force, the Protocol shall enter into force on the date of
deposit of its instrument of ratification.
PROTOCOL 1
The Parties to the this Protocol,
Noting the Model Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (the Treaty),
Have Agreed as follows:
Article 1
Each Party undertakes to apply, in respect of the territories for which it
is internationally responsible and which are situated within the Nuclear
Free Zone, the prohibitions contained in Articles 1 through 5, and the
reporting, complaint and settlement procedures specified in Articles
11(1), 11(2), 11(5), (12), 13(1) and 13(3).
Article 2
Each Party may, by written notification to the Depositary, indicate its
acceptance from the date of such notification of any alteration to its obli-
gation under this Protocol brought about by the entry into force of an
amendment to the Treaty pursuant to Article 15 of the Treaty.
Article 3
This Protocol shall be open for signature by [all States which are, de jure
or de facto, internationally responsible for territories within the Nuclear
Free Zone].
Article 4
This Protocol shall be subject to ratification.
Article 5
This Protocol is of a permanent nature and shall remain in force
indefinitely.
Article 6
This Protocol shall enter into force for each State on the date of its de-
posit with the Depositary of its instrument of ratification.
PROTOCOL 2
The Parties to this Protocol,
Noting the Model Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (the Treaty),
Have Agreed as follows:
Article 1
Each Party undertakes not to use or threaten to use any nuclear explosive
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device against:
a) Parties to the Treaty, or
b) any territory within the Nuclear Free Zone for which a State that
has become a Party to Protocol 1 is internationally responsible.
Article 2
Each Party undertakes not to contribute to any act of a Party to the
Treaty which constitutes a violation of the Treaty, or to any act of an-
other Party to a Protocol which constitutes a violation of a Protocol.
Article 3
Each Party may, by written notification to the Depositary, indicate its
acceptance from the date of such notification of any alteration to its obli-
gation under this Protocol brought about by the entry into force of an
amendment to the Treaty pursuant to Article 15 of the Treaty or by the
extension of the Nuclear Free Zone pursuant to Article 20 of the Treaty.
Article 4
This Protocol shall be open for signature by the French Republic, the
People's Republic of China, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United
States of America.
Article 5
This Protocol shall be subject to ratification.
Article 6
This Protocol is of a permanent nature and shall remain in force
indefinitely.
Article 7
This Protocol shall enter into force for each State on the date of its de-
posit with the Depositary of its instrument of ratification.
PROTOCOL 3
The Parties to this Protocol,
Noting the Model Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (the Treaty),
Have Agreed as follows:
Article 1
Each Party undertakes not to test any nuclear explosive device anywhere
within the Nuclear Free Zone.
Article 2
Each Party may, by written notification to the Depositary, indicate its
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acceptance from the date of such notification of any alteration to its obli-
gation under this Protocol brought about by the entry into force of an
amendment to the Treaty pursuant to Article 15 of the Treaty or by the
extension of the Nuclear Free Zone pursuant to Article 20 of the Treaty.
Article 3
This Protocol shall be open for signature by the French Republic, the
People's Republic of China, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United
States of America.
Article 4
This Protocol shall be subject to ratification.
Article 5
This Protocol is of a permanent nature and shall remain in force
indefinitely.
Article 6
This Protocol shall enter into force for each State on the date of its de-
posit with the Depositary of its instrument of ratification.
PROTOCOL 4
The Parties to this Protocol,
Noting the Model Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (the Treaty),
Have Agreed as follows:
Article 1
Each Party undertakes not to. transit territory or airspace, or visit ports
or airfields within the Nuclear Free Zone, with warships or military air-
craft which are nuclear-powered or carry nuclear explosive devices of any
kind.
Article 2
Each Party may, by written notification to the Depositary, indicate its
acceptance from the date of such notification of any alteration to its obli-
gation under this Protocol brought about by the entry into force of an
amendment to the Treaty pursuant to Article 15 of the Treaty or by the
extension of the Nuclear Free Zone pursuant to Article 20 of the Treaty.
Article 3
This Protocol shall be open for signature by the French Republic, the
People's Republic of China, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United
States of America.
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Article 4
This Protocol shall be subject to ratification.
Article 5
This Protocol is of a permanent nature and shall remain in force
indefinitely.
Article 6
This Protocol shall enter into force for each State on the date of the de-
posit with the Depositary of the instrument of ratification of the last
State eligible to sign this Protocol.
PROTOCOL 5
The Parties to this Protocol,
Noting the Model Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (the Treaty),
Have Agreed as follows:
Article 1
Each Party undertakes not to test any delivery vehicle or other device
designed or intended for the carrying, guiding or deploying nuclear explo-
sive devices through or over the Nuclear Free Zone.
Article 2
Each Party may, by written notification to the Depositary, indicate its
acceptance from the date of such notification of any alteration to its obli-
gation under this Protocol brought about by the entry into force of an
amendment to the Treaty pursuant to Article 15 of the Treaty or by the
extension of the Nuclear Free Zone pursuant to Article 20 of the Treaty.
Article 3
This Protocol shall be open for signature by the French Republic, the
People's Republic of China, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United
States of America.
Article 4
This Protocol shall be subject to ratification.
Article 5
This Protocol is of a permanent nature and shall remain in force
indefinitely.
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Article 6
This Protocol shall enter into force for each State on the date of the de-
posit with the Depositary of the instrument of ratification of the last
State eligible to sign this Protocol.
